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LEADERSHIP TRANSITION IN BLACK AFRICA:
ELITE GENERATIONS AND POLITICAL SUCCESSION
Dr. Victor T. Le Vine

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LEADERSHIP TRANSITION IN BLACK AFRICA:
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Dr. Victor T. Le Vine

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COVER: President Ahidjo of Cameroon handing regimental colors to a unit of his troops. The photograph made (by the author) on January 1, 1961, in Yaounde, symbolizes the ambiguous relationships between the military and civilians.

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Introduction*

In 1957 Professor John Herz speculated about the "demise of the territorial state," suggesting that given the new forms of boundary-annihilating warfare, "whatever remained of the impermeability of states seems to have gone for good."¹ His thesis, to say the least, was premature; the period since 1945 has seen the rise of an unprecedented number of new states--almost 70 at last count, including some insular and territorial dots on the map that have little to show for their sovereignty except gaudy postage stamps and representation at the U.N. Thirty-seven new states, all successors to colonial rule, emerged in Africa during this period, and regimes, governments, and political leaders have succeeded one another in them in a progression remarkable both for its frequency and pace. In short, Africa represents an area in which leadership change at the highest political levels can be observed and studied in sufficient case numbers to permit reasonable attempts at descriptive generalization. There is no lack, of course, of analyses dealing with the related subject of the transition to independence, the emergence of single-party or military regimes, and such other phenomena on the system level. What is somewhat surprising is the paucity of analyses that deal with the specific phenomenon of leadership succession on the national level, and what is even rarer, that do so in any systematic comparative manner. Not only is that literature sparse as it deals with Africa, but the same observation holds true for succession studies focussing on other, non-African political systems.² This paper proposes some exploratory analyses of postwar leadership transition in Africa.

The purpose of this study can be simply put: within the context of African leadership succession at the national level, to examine certain key descriptive characteristics of successor elites with a view to generating useful propositions about the nature and impact of leadership changes on the continent. The argument will proceed on two levels. Initially, it will focus on executive leaders in 37 of 41 independent African states (excluding South Africa, the Maghreb states, Libya, the U. A. R.). The second part will treat data on ministerial-level leaders derived from 14 so-called "francophone" states, all formerly French colonies, specifically the following: Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Ivory Coast, Togo, Dahomey, Cameroon, Chad,

*This study is a substantial revision and updating of an earlier paper presented at the 1973 annual meeting of the African Studies Association.

the Central African Republic, The People's Republic of Congo, and Gabon. Not included is the Malagasy Republic. It is a choice, stated without further elaboration, that rests on certain analytical similarities that make it possible to compare these states, as well as to derive valid generalizations about them as a group. Among these similarities are such things as a common language, a common colonial heritage, comparable institutional and constitutional systems, and a remarkably homogeneous political elite culture.*

Two other related preliminary choices, stated as definitions, also serve to narrow the focus of this study. The primary emphasis is on leaders of governments. We assume, for purposes of analysis, that with few exceptions, a regime or a government is identified with its leaders, and that they are the men occupying the highest national (governmental) executive positions. The units of analysis, therefore, comprise only two sets. The first is comprised of men occupying the very top positions, be they presidents, vice-presidents, prime ministers, monarchs, or "chairmen" of what are in effect collective executives. Are these positions in fact valid units of comparative analysis? Admittedly, considering the different loci of ultimate decision-making within African states, the positions are hardly equivalent on that ground. Certainly, for example, there is considerable difference between King Sobhuza of Swaziland and King Moshoeshoe II of Lesotho; the former (since June, 1973) in fact both rules and reigns, having combined elements of traditional patrimonial authority and modern legal-rational power in his own office, whereas the latter was reduced to a mere figurehead by his Prime Minister, Leabua Jonathan, who actually runs the government. Similar problems attend comparisons between the heads of military regimes; some have remained simply "front men," with power held collectively by a junta or "committee," while others were clearly in charge from the beginning, and still others rose to the top after an initial shakedown period. In most cases, however, our title "top leader" covers relatively well those entitled to that designation on both positional and empirical grounds, and enables us to operate under the assumption that position and power in Africa tend to be generally consonant. In fact, "front men" and "figureheads" are very much the exception in Africa. For every General Joseph Ankrah (Ghana) and Aman Andom (Ethiopia), there are a dozen leaders who rise to the top very quickly or who reveal themselves soon after taking power. There has never been any ambiguity

*The point is amplified in my Political Leadership in Africa (Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1967), Chap. 1.

about the roles of such leaders as Yakubu Gowon (Nigeria), Idi Amin (Uganda), Jean Bokassa (CAR), Sangoulé Lamizana (Upper Volta), Etienne Eyadema (Togo), Moussa Traore (Mali), Seyni Kountche (Niger), Ignatius Acheampong (Ghana), etc. In any case, by including both heads of state and government (plus vice-presidents and the like) in our analysis, we arrive at units that permit reasonable cross-national comparisons.

The second set consists of whole cabinets, usually including those persons in the first category. The initial, all-African focus will utilize only the first set; the "francophone" discussion will deal with the second.

This study does not deal with leaders below the national level, nor does it deal with regime characteristics save indirectly as our discussion may touch on policies, styles, philosophies, and other descriptive attributes of the leaders in question. This choice permits such terms as "succession," "coup," and the like to be used within manageable (although admittedly, restrictive) bounds, that is, as they apply to national leaders. System characteristics are not assumed to be irrelevant, but as reflecting, within rather broad limits, the characteristics of regimes and governments. Our choice also rests on the assumption that national policies, styles, and ideologies in Africa are still very much the reflections of what African national leaders make of them. Moreover, it must be admitted, the choice permits the whole tempting (but analytically messy) question of stability to be bypassed. We deliberately side-stepped the distinction between regimes and governments, a distinction that becomes important if (among other possibilities) differences in style, ideology, and base political values between governing elites are considered important to analysis. These are matters, as we indicated, that are only marginal to the central concerns of this paper.*

I. African Leadership Succession, 1945-1973

A. The Contexts of Succession

To facilitate the discussion, a common vocabulary of leadership

*For a study of succession in which the distinction is important, see Ladun Anise's paper, cited in Footnote 2.

succession in Africa is needed. Our typology, displayed in Table 1, is based on the general, four-category analysis of "executive change" developed by Taylor and Hudson in the second edition of the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.³ Since we seek to describe changes in personnel, and to examine differences in their backgrounds and other characteristics, we use only two of Taylor and Hudson's categories: "regular executive transfer," and "irregular power transfer" (plus specific types under each rubric) to encompass the cases relevant to our analysis. Thus, Taylor and Hudson's "renewal of executive tenure" (what Anise calls "self-succession"⁴), and "executive adjustment," insofar as neither includes change in personnel at the top executive positions, are not used in this paper, or at least in its first major part. The second, "francophone" part, deals mainly with "executive adjustments" at the ministerial level. In any case, Table 1 distinguishes between the various instances of executive leadership succession on the basis of two criteria: (1) according to the relevance of established rules--constitutions, laws, customs, etc.--that regulate succession; and (2) according to the key event that led to the succession. For example, even though Burundi Prime Minister Joseph Bamina was designated as such by the Mwami (King), it was the assassination of his predecessor, Pierre Ngendandumwe, that led directly to Bamina's accession to office. Hence, his "succession event" is recorded under "irregular power change assassination" (category IIA in Table 1). The taxonomy is accompanied by sets of figures representing the frequency with which the several named events occurred between 1945 and December 31, 1974. The table itself is based on the list of succession events provided in Annex A; events were included in Annex A if they met the definitional requirements set out in Annex B. Annex B also deals with the problem of sequential events, as a coup followed by a counter-coup, and the like.

Some of the more spectacular African succession events have been discussed elsewhere in ample detail and with considerable analytical insight,⁵ but there is little need to examine them here in such terms. What is relevant for our concerns is that the fact of the frequency of the events and the scale of the personnel turnover that they imply raise important questions for further analysis. Table 1 provides no more than categories and numbers appropriate to each; it names and enumerates the contexts within which leadership succession took place. It says nothing about the leaders involved, nor does it suggest patterns amenable to descriptive generalization. It is to these matters that we now turn.

TABLE 1

Post-Independence Executive Leadership
Succession Events^a in Black Africa, 1945 - 1974

<u>Types</u>	<u>No. of Events</u>	<u>Totals</u>
I. Regular Executive Transfers		
A. Elections	7	
B. Cabinet crises, shakeups, revisions	25	
C. Amalgamation, constitutional revisions	11	
D. Natural or accidental death of Head of State or Government	3	46
II. Irregular Power Changes		
A. Assassinations, political murders	3 (7) ^b	
B. Depositions	1 (3) ^c	
C. Elimination contests; resignations	4 (5)	
D. Coups d'etat ^d		
1. Military	29	
2. Military-civilian, mixed	2	
3. Civilian-military, mixed	5	
4. Civilian	1 (2)	
E. Designation, appointment	3 ^e	48 (56)
	Total, all types:	94 (102)

Notes to Table 1:

a. "Executive leadership succession events" are those involving heads of state and/or government, as well as individuals at top governing positions, such as vice-presidents, cochairmen of governing councils, and the like. "Event" was used in the sense described by Taylor and Hudson (see Footnote 3), at pp. 83-4, and we have accepted their coding conventions in the enumerations here and in Annex A. Definitions of the terms are provided in Annex B.

b. The two numbers reflect our own ambiguity about acts of political murder and assassination. The first number represents those events in which an act of political murder or assassination led directly to succession, as, for example, when Aboud Jumbe became First Vice-President of Tanzania in place of the assassinated Abeid Karume. The

second, in parentheses, includes the first set, plus those instances in which assassination or political murder was a by-product of another succession event, such as a military coup. The killings of President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo and Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria, for example, fit into the latter category, as does the death of General Mikael Aman Andom, former head of the Ethiopian Provisional Military Administrative Council, in November, 1974.

It should be added that the murder of former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba (Zaire) in 1961 was not included in our count. Murder it probably was, but not assassination, and in any case, it was not a succession event since Lumumba was out of office at the time.*

c. The example in question is the removal of President Sourou Migan Apithy by Prime Minister Justin Ahomadegbe (Dahomey, November, 1965); the parenthetical cases are the final removal of President Philibert Tsiranana of Malagasy by General Gabriel Ramanantsoa in October, 1972, and the deposition of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in September, 1974.

d. Anise (op. cit.) talks about "revolutionary coups," perhaps confusing still more an already confusing situation. We have avoided the term, and indeed the whole question of "revolution," because the term has been emasculated by its loose usage. Successful military juntas tend to label their particular ventures "revolution" if only to give the impression that the exercise involves sweeping, thorough, system-wide changes, all to the good. Whether a "revolution," so named, in fact accomplishes widespread, profound systemic change is an empirical question and involves judgments that cannot be made before the fact, or in any case, just after the coup itself. Surely there are considerable differences (in consequences, participation, etc.) between the "revolutions" in Ghana (1966), Congo/Brazzaville (1963), and Uganda (1971), yet all have been given that label by their principal actors. The re-imposition of complete military control by President Lamizana of Upper Volta (in February, 1974), involving dismissal of the civilian ministry of Prime Minister Gérard Kango Ouedraogo, is included here despite some ambiguities in the definition of the situation.

e. Two of the cases are Dahomean: one is the appointment of

*For further discussion of this whole matter, see Ali Mazrui, "Thoughts on Assassination in Africa," in his Violence and Thought (London: Longmans, 1969), pp. 187-205.

President Emile Derlin Zinsou by the Alley-Kouandété junta in August, 1968; the other is the creation of the Maga-Ahomadegbe-Apithy presidential "troika" by the junta led by Colonel Paul Emile de Souza in May, 1970. The third case is the elimination of the vice-presidency in the Congo People's Republic (1973) which forced Ange-Edouard Pongui out of the government and permitted President Marien Ngouabi to appoint Henri Lopes as Prime Minister in August, 1973. In all three cases, what the military gave, the military took away. It could also be argued that the Ghanaian Presidential Commission set in in 1969 (and composed of three leaders of the military-police junta that had ruled the country since 1966) was really an artifact imposed on the civilian regime of Dr. Kofi Busia by the late junta; if so, it would fall under this rubric. We do not so include it because "impose" misrepresents the contexts within which the Presidential Commission was created and under which it operated. It should be recalled that the Commission dissolved itself in August, 1970, and in that same month, Edward Akufo-Addo, a jurist, was chosen President in accordance with the provisions of the 1969 constitution.

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B. Elite Generations

Post-independence leadership succession in Africa has involved what are in fact two analytically distinct generations of leadership that can be termed, broadly and for want of better names, the "founding fathers" and the "successors."⁶ We distinguish the "founding fathers" as those leaders who led nationalist parties and/or brought their countries to independence and then usually went on to become the principals of government and state of their new nations. This is the so-called "revolutionary" generation, though on closer inspection of its members' behavior and the circumstances in which they attained power, it hardly deserves the title. It should also be noted that not all the members of this generation survived the transition to independence. Some rose to become premiers, prime ministers, and leaders of government business during the period of dyarchy that often preceded the actual attainment of independence, and then ceded their positions to others who took over and eventually received the grant of independence. Several vice-présidents du conseil, who in fact exercised what amounted to Prime Ministerial responsibilities in French-speaking territories, are included in this lot: André Marie Mbida (in office 1957-58) of Cameroon, Gabriel Lisette (1957-59) of Chad, Jacques Opangault (1957-58) of Congo/Brazzaville, Sourou Migan Apithy (1957-59, but

who later returned to high office) of Dahomey, and Djibo Bakary (1957-58) of Niger. Also included are Pierre Sarr N'Jie, who was Chief Minister of Gambia from 1961 to 1962, and Ronald Ngala, Kenya's Leader of Government Business from April to November, 1961. Finally, three important members of this generation died within a year or two of their countries' independence. Had they survived, they would unquestionably have become either heads of state or government: Ouezzin Coulibaly, of Upper Volta, who died in 1958; Barthelemy Boganda of the Central African Republic, who was killed in an airplane crash in 1959; and Prince Louis Rwagasore of Burundi, who was assassinated in 1961. The latter three men, it should be added, were already titular heads of their respective governments at the time of their deaths. In any case, our "founding fathers" generation broadly designates the first national leaders of the new African states, whether they held office during the dyarchy or not (and for most of the purposes of our analysis), less those leaders who either died or left office before independence.

We distinguish the "successor" generation as comprising, again in broadest terms, those leaders who took over national leadership positions from "founding fathers." For the purposes of our analysis, the "successor" generation will be examined first as an aggregate to derive descriptive characteristics of age, education, previous occupation, and length of tenure, and then two sets of leaders--one holding office on June 1, 1968, and the other on December 31, 1974--will be examined for the same characteristics so as to give a longitudinal perspective on such changes as may have occurred in the group as a whole. The latter sets will be labelled "1968 incumbents" and "1974 incumbents," respectively. Finally, a third group of leaders, the "saints and martyrs"--all dead and largely irrelevant to this study--is mentioned here for the sake of completing the list. The "saints and martyrs" are the departed heroes of the "nationalist struggle." In addition to Ouezzin Coulibaly, Barthelemy Boganda, and Prince Louis Rwagasore, they include such men as Herbert Macaulay (Nigeria) and Amilcar Cabral (Guinea-Bissau), who was assassinated January 20, 1973. All died before their countries attained independence. Also included in this group are Patrice Lumumba (Congo/Kinshasa) and Joseph Danquah (Ghana) who both died after their countries' independence. The "saints and martyrs" are considered rather like revered ancestors, whose demise is mourned but who, because they are dead, become available to legitimate (by reference) their successors. In any case, however the "saints and martyrs" are viewed, it is the other two groups that are of principal interest here.

1. The Founding Fathers

This group consists of 44 leaders, 46 if Ethiopia and Liberia are included. It would be difficult, on strict analytical grounds, to accord the first postwar leaders of the latter countries--Emperor Haile Selassie and President William V.S. Tubman, respectively--"founding father" status for obvious reasons. However, for purposes of our analysis, they are included in both "founding father" and "incumbent" categories.

TABLE 2
Founding Fathers, Age Data

	Original Founding Fathers			Remaining Founding Fathers	
	Age at Independence (N:44) ^a	Age at Succession (N:44) ^b	Age at Succession <u>all postwar</u> (N:52) ^c	Age in 1968 (6-1-68)	Age in 1974 (12-31-74)
Average	45.8	43.5	44.1	54.1	58.1
Median	47.0	45.0	--	52	56
Range	27-70	21-70	--	30-76	36-81
Modal Class	40-49 (16)	40-49 (16)	--	50-56 (8)	50-60 (8)

Sources: See Annex C.

Notes to Table 2:

a. All 37 states, excluding Liberia, Ethiopia, and Guinea-Bissau.

b. All 37 states, excluding Liberia and Ethiopia, because their leaders entered their positions before 1945. Also excluding Guinea-Bissau.

c. Includes all prime ministers, premiers, vice-présidents du conseil, chief ministers, leaders of government business, etc., who held office before independence, but did not carry over beyond independence, for whatever reasons.

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Three sets of data, from which gross characteristics of the group can be derived, are relevant to this discussion: age, education, and occupation (immediately prior to entering political life). Tables 2 and 3 array the age data. Educational and occupational data from this group, as well as for the "successors" and "incumbents" are displayed in Tables 4 and 5. Parsimony of presentation and ease of comparison dictated consolidation of these data in the latter two tables.

Age at succession is included above because a number of "founding fathers" became Heads of Government as prime ministers, premiers, or leaders of government business, etc., in French or British colonies during the dyarchy period before independence.⁷ The age data on the remaining "founding fathers" takes on additional meaning if the distribution of their chronological ages is compared to the distribution of what can be called "positional age," that is, the number of years which a remaining "founding father" has occupied his present or an equivalent position. "Positional age" helps to distinguish between "founding fathers" whose countries arrived at independence relatively recently (within the last eight or so years), and those whose countries became independent prior to that time (for most states, roughly between 1954 and 1964). Table 3 displays both actual and positional ages and includes the names of leaders as a reference to clarify the comparison.

Table 3 demonstrates that not only are the surviving "founding fathers" very much an older generation in terms of chronological age, but that the members of the group over 50 (the 14 in 1968 and 1974) are also very much part of an older political generation. Moreover, 10 of the 15 leaders with positional ages of nine or above in 1968 were found in the older (50+) set within this group. This point takes on added importance when it is recalled that 31 of the 40 independent African states gained their independence on or after 1960; put another way, in 1968 only 8 of the 40 had been states for more than 8 years. The combination of older leaders in young states is not by itself significant, save insofar as it represents survival of a generation of leaders increasingly challenged by what appears to be a much younger generation of leaders. That latter generation has already begun to come into its own; the "successors," to be discussed shortly, are representative of that group.

TABLE 3

Surviving "Founding Fathers,"
Chronological and Positional Ages,
6-1-68 and 12-31-74

Country	Name	Chronological Ages		Positional Ages ^a	
		1968	1974	1968	1974
Ethiopia	Haile Selassie	76	R	38	--
Kenya	Jomo Kenyatta	75	81	5	11
Swaziland	Sobhuza II	(69) ^b	75	0 ^(b)	6
Liberia	William V. S. Tubman	73	D	24	--
Ivory Coast	Felix Houphouet Boigny	63	69	10	16
Senegal	Leopold S. Senghor	62	68	10	16
Malawi	Hastings K. Banda	62	68	4	10
Sudan	Ismail al Azhari	56	D	14	--
Malagasy R.	Philibert Tsiranana	56	R	10	--
Lesotho	Leabua Jonathan	54	60	3	9
Mali	Modibo Keita	53	R	10	--
Niger	Hamani Diori	52	R	10	--
Cameroon	John N. Foncha	52	R	9	--
Chad	François Tombalbaye	50	56	9	15
Tanzania	Julius Nyerere	50	56	7	13
Somalia	Abdirashid Ali Shirmarke	49	D	8	--
Botswana	Seretse Khama	47	53	2	8
Guinea	Sékou Touré	46	52	9	15
Cameroon	Ahmadou Ahidjo	44	50	10	16
Rwanda	Gregoire Kayibanda	44	R	7	--
Mauritania	Moktar Ould Daddah	44	50	9	15
Zambia	Kenneth Kaunda	44	50	4	10
Equatorial Guinea	F. Macias Nguéma	(42) ^c	48	0 ^(c)	6
Lesotho	Moshoeshoe II	30	36	9	15

R: Removed or Retired

D: Deceased

Notes to Table 3:

a. Tenure in modern political roles, only. The measure does not apply to years in traditional offices, as chieftaincies, or specifically, the Mwamiship of Burundi, Paramount Chieftaincy of Lesotho and Swaziland, etc.

b. Sobhuza acceded to the Swazi throne as Ngwenyama ("Lion" or "King") in 1921; he did not become head of the modern state until September, 1968, when Swaziland became independent.

c. President Macias Nguéma had just assumed office; his positional age in 1968 was less than 1, or "0"; King Sobhuza was just about to assume office.

Analyses:

a. Chronological Ages, Frequencies

1968, N:24	73 - 76 : 3	1974, N:15	81 : 1
	62 - 69 : 4		75 : 1
	50 - 56 : 8		60 - 69 : 4
	46 - 49 : 4		50 - 56 : 7
	44 : 4		48 : 1
	30 : 1		36 : 1
	(Mean: 54.1)		(Mean: 58.1)

b. Positional Ages, Frequencies

1968, N:24	38 = 1	1974, N:15	15 - 16 : 7
	24 = 1		13 : 1
	14 = 1		10 - 11 : 3
	10 = 6		8 - 9 : 2
5 -	9 = 8		6 : 2
2 -	4 = 4		
	0 = 2		
	(Mean: 9.21)		(Mean: 12.06)

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We turn now to the occupational and educational background of the "founding fathers." ("Successors" and "incumbents" were included in the Table, as was noted, for reasons of parsimony and later comparisons.)

TABLE 4

Founding Fathers, Successors, Incumbents:
Levels of Educational Attainment, Compared

Educational Level Attained	Founding Fathers		All Successors		1968 Incumbents		1974 Incumbents	
	N=46 ^a	%	N=88 ^b	%	N=47 ^c	%	N=48 ^d	%
Advanced post-secondary & University	23	50.0	39	44.3	18	38.3	21	43.7
Secondary	20	43.4	39	44.3	25	53.1	19	39.5
Primary								
Self-taught,	2)	6.5	3)	4.5	3)	8.5	3)	12.5
little, or none	1)		1)		1)		3)	
No data			6	6.8			2	4.1

Sources: See Annex C.

Notes to Table 4:

a. Including Haile Selassie and W.V.S. Tubman, but not Luis Cabral.

b. Not including "founding fathers" appearing in new roles or positions, or in the same positions after a hiatus, but including Luis Cabral.

c. Including Haile Selassie and Tubman.

d. Including Luis Cabral.

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Tables 4 and 5 indicate that, as a group, the "founding fathers" were well-educated men, much better educated than the vast majority of the populations they represented. In the aggregate, they were also somewhat better educated than their successors. By most standards they could well be termed "intellectuals"; almost all attained what, by conditions prevailing at the time they were schooled, was a very good education indeed.⁸ In French-speaking Africa, for example, graduates of the Ecole Normale William Ponty near Dakar, or of some of the

Catholic seminaries, regarded themselves with particular pride, as members of the African "elite."⁹ Given their education and the fact that the channels of occupational mobility were, in most cases, quite restrictive for Africans, it is not surprising that many of them-- 30.4% of this group--went into teaching. A teacher commanded status and prestige not only because he had mastered the skills that opened the doors of colonial society (such as literacy, mathematics, technical expertise), but was his own man in a way a subaltern administrator in an office dominated by Europeans could never be. He could speak more freely, had access to greater numbers of people, all of which made it easier for him to turn to politics than for the civil servant.¹⁰ Overall, the group is dominated by its modern professionals, that is, nearly 78% entered politics from an occupation requiring some or considerable technical training.

2. The Successors

This group consists of 88 men, all of whom reached national leadership positions after World War II. They ranged in age (at succession) from 68 (Abdullah Khalil, Sudan) to 18 (Ntare V, Burundi), with the mean age at succession of 41.9 years. Though the educational attainments of the members of this group, shown on Table 4, are somewhat lower in the "higher education" category and higher in the "secondary" category than those of the "founding fathers," generally there was not much difference between the two groups.

The similarities persist in a comparison of the two groups' occupational backgrounds (Table 5). First, 72, or 81% of the "successors"-- including the military men, most of whom were officers-- came to politics from professions or occupations requiring technical competence. A point of difference, of course, is that the military men comprise the largest percentage of the "successors" in displacing both teachers and chiefs, whose numbers declined sharply in the second group. Most of the soldiers, it must be added, were relatively well-educated men, having been trained in various secondary schools, in military academies (for example, Brigadier Andrew Juxon Smith of Sierra Leone, Colonel Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria, Brigadier Akwasi Afrifa of Ghana are all graduates of Sandhurst; General Ibrahim Abboud (Sudan) attended Gordon Military College; and Captain Alfred Raoul (Congo/Brazzaville), St. Cyr), or at universities. Important as is this difference, it nonetheless remains fact that the "successors," as a group, are men with levels of education and professional and technical competence relatively similar to those attained by the "founding fathers." In Africa, the modern professionals continue to dominate the political stage, though increasingly more of them are military rather than civilian professionals.

TABLE 5

Founding Fathers, Successors, and Incumbents:
Occupational Backgrounds^a Compared

<u>Occupations</u>	<u>Founding Fathers</u>		<u>All Successors</u>		<u>1968 Incumbents</u>		<u>1974 Incumbents</u>	
	<u>(N=46)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N=88)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N=47)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N=48)</u>	<u>%</u>
Educators, teachers	14	30.4	8	9.0	9	19.1	5	10.4
Kings and traditional rulers	6	13.0	1	1.1	5	10.6	4	8.3
Administrators and Civil servants	10	20.4	12	13.6	6	12.7	7	14.5
Physicians, veterinarians, medical assistants	4	8.7	4	4.5	4	8.5	4	8.3
Businessmen	1	2.1	3	3.4	2	4.2	1	2.0
Lawyers, jurists	3	6.5	6	6.8	3	6.4	2	4.1
Poets, novelists, journalists	1	2.1	1	1.1	--	--	--	--
Military men	--	--	34	38.6	9	19.1	16	33.3
Policemen	--	--	3	3.4	3	6.4	2	4.1
Politicians	3	6.5	3	3.4	--	--	1	2.0
Trade Unionists	2	4.3	2	2.2	2	4.2	3	6.2
Engineers, scientists	--	--	3	3.4	--	--	--	--
Accountants	1	2.1	2	2.2	--	--	--	--
Planters, farmers	1	2.1	--	--	2	4.2	2	4.1
Ministers, pastors	--	--	1	1.1	1	2.1	1	2.0
Sailors	--	--	1	1.1	1	2.1	--	--
Clerks, commercial	--	--	1	1.1	--	--	--	--
No data	--	--	3	3.4	--	--	--	--

Sources: See Annex C.

Note to Table 5:

a. "Occupational background" is here used to designate a leader's principal occupation before he entered political office, whether he was elected, appointed, or entered by some other means.

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3. The Incumbents and Comparisons

This group, it will be recalled, was divided into two sub-groups for purposes of analysis: the "1968 incumbents" (those in office on June 1, 1968) and the "1974 incumbents" (those in office on December 31, 1974). There were 47 in the first sub-group, and 48 in the second. The average age of the "1968 incumbents" was 49.9, a figure, however, that conceals a ten-year difference between the average age of the surviving "founding fathers" (54.1) and the average age of the incumbent "successors" (44.25). The "1974 incumbents" average age was 51.0, but in this sub-group the age gap between surviving "founding fathers" (average age, 58.1) and that of the incumbent "successors" (average age, 43.0) had increased to 14.2 years. This gap and its growth between 1968 and 1974 was apparently due more to the entrance of a number of younger (30-40) soldiers and bureaucrats onto the national scene than to the survival of older (50+) "founding fathers." How do the ages of the "incumbents," overall, compare with those of the other two groups? Table 6 supplies the answer.

Though Table 6 appears to indicate that leaders in all four of the age-sets attained office at about the same general age (between 41 and 44 years), it remains noteworthy that younger people are attaining high office in increasingly greater numbers, and that they attain--or take--that leadership at a younger age. Finally, the comparisons demonstrate that quite generally, politics--particularly national leadership politics--remains very much a young man's game. The low succession ages of African national leaders compare dramatically to similarly derived age figures in Europe and the United States, where national executives succeeded to high office at ages averaging from 10 to 20 years higher than appears to have been the case in Africa.¹¹ Two things undoubtedly help to account for the difference. One is the simple fact that the life expectancy of the average African male is relatively low, compared to that of his American or European counterpart.* A

*The average life expectancy for the African male is ca. 46, that of the European, an average of 72. United Nations, Demographic Year-book for 1971.

TABLE 6

Age Data Compared:
Founding Fathers, Successors, Incumbents

	Average Age at Succession	Average Age at Independence	Average Age in 1968 (6-1-68)	Average Age in 1974 (12-31-74)
Founding Fathers	(N= 44) 43.5	(N= 44) 45.8	(N= 24) 54.1	(N= 15) 58.1
Successors	(N= 88) 41.9	--	(N= 23) ^a 44.25	(N= 33) ^b 43.9
1968 Incumbents (N=47)	43.1	45.4	49.4	--
1974 Incumbents (N= 48)	43.4	46.3	--	51.0

Sources: See Annex C.

Notes to Table 6:

a. In office on 6-1-68.

b. In office on 12-31-74.

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political career, if it is to be successful, must be begun at an early age. The other is the fact that most African states face a continuing penury of trained, educated people available to occupy high positions in government. This is coupled with increased opportunities, at least during the first few years after independence, for young people to enter high public office, a change that occurred once the mobility constraints of colonialism were eliminated by the advent of independence. (Evidence for this is presented in the second part of this study, when various aspects of cabinet turnover in French-speaking Africa are examined.)

The "incumbents'" educational and professional backgrounds, when compared with those of the "founding fathers" and the "successors," are equally interesting. The relative similarity in educational

background of the first two groups was noted earlier. What needs to be reemphasized is that the "successor" group contained only a slightly higher proportion of technically trained persons than did the "founding father" group. The occupational background comparisons reinforce this finding, though it should be noted that the figures for the first two categories in the "incumbent group" (educators and traditional rulers) are magnified by the presence of nine surviving "founding fathers" in the first category and five in the second. In any case, the important point is that, save in the category of military leaders, the differences between the three groups on the dimension of occupational background are visible but are not very great. The implications of this and of other findings suggested in the foregoing discussion are traced in the next section.

C. Succession Patterns

Overwhelmingly, African states attained their independence peacefully. Only in the cases of Algeria, Rwanda and Burundi, Congo/Kinshasa (Zaire), and Guinea-Bissau (plus Angola and Mozambique, both, perhaps, attaining independence in 1975) can it be said that independence was directly caused or even hastened by revolution or the existence of a revolutionary situation.¹² Our descriptive analysis of the first African successors, here called "founding fathers," tends not only to reinforce the point but to suggest that the "founding fathers" were, as a group, less of a revolutionary generation than their rhetoric implied. No less than 22 of the 46 "founding fathers" attained national leadership positions--premierships, prime ministerships, and the like--on the average two to four years before their countries attained independence. They were, for the most part, if the data are reliable, men formed by and within the colonial systems they supplanted: their occupational backgrounds generally tell of activity within the colonial context (particularly in civil services and teaching), and their education appears to have prepared them to come to terms with the colonial situation rather than to resist it. They were not, for the most part, revolutionaries because the changes they sought could be effected without revolution, within the rules for decolonization which many of them had helped to write. They used revolutionary rhetoric, developed agitational political styles, but when they were invited to do so, peacefully negotiated their countries' transition to independence. Agitators, mobilizers of public sentiment, negotiators, perhaps; but not revolutionaries, either in style or behavior.¹³

Once in power, the "founding fathers," for reasons not germane

to this study, soon found themselves challenged in their exercise of power. The first succession crises usually took place within three to five years after independence.¹⁴ Though the "founding fathers" had either written succession provisions into their countries constitutions or operated under such rules, major succession occurred more frequently in crisis situations or as the result of some unconstitutional event¹⁵ than under peaceful auspices (see Table 1). The military "successors" usually took power by military coups d'etat (34 of the 88), and two of them did so at least twice (Christophe Soglo of Dahomey and Joseph Mobutu of Zaire). Though in terms of their backgrounds the "successors" were not noticeably different than the "founding fathers" (again, excepting the military), they tended to be younger, and their youthfulness stood out in increasing relief against the aging and aged "founding fathers" who managed to remain in power (Table 6). It would be tempting to argue that the longer "founding fathers" remain in office, the better their chances of surviving or even of ensuring their own peaceful replacement. However, a good many in this group have remained in power only by surviving serious and often repeated challenges to their rule. The prognosis for peaceful leadership transition is probably none too good for most of them, particularly those in office for ten or more years. Though space will only permit a cursory look, review of a few situations may help make the point.

1. Chad: President François Tombalbaye is by no means secure; alleged plotters were tried and convicted in 1963, 1965, and 1970, and at least ten attempted coups have been reported by the government.¹⁶

2. Guinea: Since 1958, more than a dozen anti-government plots have been reported; in 1969 an attempt was made on President Sékou Touré's life. Over 400,000 Guineans now live in exile outside the country, many of them in neighboring Senegal and Ivory Coast, and several organizations with the avowed purpose of overthrowing President Sékou Touré have been formed by exiles.¹⁷

3. Ivory Coast: At least four plots to assassinate President Félix Houphouët Boigny have been reported; a military plot to seize power was allegedly uncovered in 1973.¹⁸ Young Ivoriens, particularly those in the University and the secondary schools, remain restive, and periodic anti-government demonstrations have become a feature of political life in Abidjan.

4. Kenya: Ethnic rivalries between Luo and Kikuyu may prevent peaceful succession to President Jomo Kenyatta. The integration of ex-opposition leaders into the ruling Kenya African National Union has served to shift the jockeying for the succession to a less viable, though no less explosive, arena.¹⁹

5. Senegal: The party of President Leopold Senghor appears to have become increasingly ossified; opposition exists among younger bureaucrats, in the lower officer ranks in the army, and among intellectuals critical of Senghor's francophilic policies. The appointment of young (35) Prime Minister Abdou Diouf may have eased the succession problem, but disaffection with the regime remains relatively widespread.²⁰

6. Cameroon: President Ahmadou Ahidjo appears to have hinted that he might step down at the completion of his current mandate (1977); he has not, however, groomed anyone for the succession. Those once directly in line to succeed him (the former Vice-Presidents of the Federal Republic) were either dropped from the national ticket at election time (John Ngu Foncha) or moved laterally into a non-contentious office (Solomon Tandeng Muna, who became President of the National Assembly when Cameroon became a Unitary state in 1972).²¹

The examples can be multiplied: in most countries where a "founding father" still holds power, little or no real attempt has been made to find a "successor," or even to insure that succession, when it takes place, will be peaceful and legal. In addition to the above cases, succession is very much in doubt in such countries as Tanzania, Zambia, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, and Swaziland. All this is not to say that there have been no instances of peaceful succession from "founding fathers" to "successors." The few that have occurred, however, have attended the death of a "founding father" by natural means (Vice-President Albert Bongo succeeding President Leon M'Ba in Gabon in 1967 and Vice-President William Tolbert succeeding President W.V.S. Tubman in Liberia in 1971) or have been engineered from on high (Tandeng Muna for Foncha as Cameroon Vice-President by Ahidjo in 1970).

All this, of course, should not be taken to suggest that the "successors" are as a group more likely to enjoy longer tenure in

office than their predecessors or to promote peaceful succession in their countries. The increasing frequency with which succession has been "irregular" succession heightens the probability that the pattern will continue. Since 1965, some 67 major succession events took place of which at least 27 were coups d'etat involving not only the replacement of those in the highest positions, but (usually) also of whole governments. In fact, some "successor" regimes appear built on the flimsiest foundations and manage to survive only by the sheerest good fortune or through the use of increasingly repressive measures. The auguries, then, for both the remaining "founding fathers" and "successors" do not appear too optimistic.

The analysis thus far permits several generalizations which may serve as preliminary hypotheses for the second section of this essay, a micro-analysis of cabinets in fourteen French-speaking African states. Briefly recapitulated, the generalizations are as follows:

1. The generation of the "founding fathers" was less a generation of revolutionaries than one of "establishmentarians" using revolutionary rhetoric.
2. That generation entered high office at a relatively young age and tended to be composed of individuals with relatively good education frequently of a technical or professional character.
3. The surviving "founding fathers" constitute, compared to their "successors," a generation of older men little inclined to cede power, and indeed more frequently than not removed by unconstitutional means.
4. The "successors" tended to enter office at a slightly younger age than their predecessors, tended to be at least as well educated as the "founding fathers," but with somewhat higher technical and professional qualifications. They do not, as a group, however, appear to confirm an hypothesized trend to a so-called "bureaucratization" of post-independence regimes.²²
5. A high percent of the "successors" were military men, and a trend to an increasing seizure of power by military men has become evident since 1965.
6. As a group, the incumbent "successors" are on the average ten to fourteen years younger than surviving

"founding fathers," suggesting the existence of a widening generational gap of some importance.

II. Leadership Succession in French-Speaking Africa, 1945-1974

As was noted earlier, the units of analysis for this section are ministerial cabinets, including the top executive positions such as presidents, vice-presidents, prime ministers, and the like. We will not follow each cabinet through every reshuffle since independence for two sets of reasons: (a) most cabinets (particularly those of Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Guinea) have been reshuffled many times since 1960; more often than not the reshuffles changed only the titles of those affected, and in any case to note each change would say little except to the possible question of instability within the regimes concerned; and (b) the biographical data, with which analysis must be made, are incomplete, often hard to find, or simply unavailable. Instead, the cabinets will be considered at two or more points in time.

1. At independence--that is, the first post-independence cabinets, some of which came into existence a year or more before independence.
2. The cabinets as of June 1, 1968 and November 30, 1974.*
3. Generally, after major leadership changes; that is, after such events as coups, the death of a "founding father," or some similar circumstance.

Again, it is the gross characteristics of the cabinets that are of primary interest here. Age, education, and previous occupation will be, as in the first section, the principal data points to be touched.

A. The Cabinets at Independence: the "Founding Fathers"

The data cover 198 cabinet officers in the fourteen states, the total number in office at or just after independence. Due to lacunae in data, however, the sample for age data is 188, 193 for occupational

*The first date was chosen because it falls approximately at midpoint between the first independence cabinets and the current year, 1975; the second because it is the most recent point at which reliable data were available for most of the fourteen states' leaders.

background, and 194 for educational attainment, but in all three areas the figures are of sufficient magnitude to permit generalizations.

On first inspection, the age data (Table 7) reveal few surprises. Overall, the average age of "founding father" cabinets at independence is 41.75, about five years less than the average for all the "founding fathers" described in Table 6. Noteworthy, however, is the spread of the averages, which range from a low of 33.5 (CAR) to a high of 49.1 (Togo). The crucial variable that explains the differences appears to be, quite simply, the level of territorial political development. Opportunities for political participation by Africans opened up much earlier in the territories of the old A.O.F. (Afrique Occidentale Française) than in those of the Old A.E.F. (Afrique Equatoriale Française); political parties, trade unions, various political organizations, as well as local political structures involving Africans, developed much earlier in Senegal, Togo, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and Upper Volta (for example) than was the case in Chad, the CAR, Gabon, or Congo/Brazzaville.²³

Also of interest is the fact that, as a whole, the independence cabinets were not new in the sense that they were composed of individuals without previous experience at the top levels of government. The first "francophone" African cabinets were organized in 1957 under the auspices of the so-called loi cadre,²⁴ which permitted the creation of territorial executives with considerable governmental capacities. Some 75% of the total positions were occupied by holdovers from these pre-independence cabinets. Only in Guinea, Senegal, and Cameroon did independence provide the occasion for a general cabinet housecleaning. A related datum, the average "positional age" (explained earlier) of the cabinets, 2.1 years, confirms this finding. (All this should not, of course, be taken to suggest cabinet stability; cabinets did change quite frequently and often radically in the ensuing years.)

The data on the educational attainment of the members of the "founding father" cabinets in Table 8 invite comparison with the findings derived from Table 7. If there is a relationship between general levels of political development and opportunities for education, and most studies suggest a strong correlation, then one would expect that, again, the ex-A.O.F. territories would have a higher percentage of well-educated men on their cabinets than those in the A.E.F. This appears to be the case: Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Togo, Mali, Dahomey--all contain high percentages of cabinet officers completing some sort of higher education, that is, collegiate or professional training beyond secondary school. The aggregate figures are not, however, quite so

TABLE 7

Independence Cabinets:
Personnel Turnover and Age Data

Country	Turnover						Ages	
	Date of Formation ^a	No. Posts	Hold-Overs (%)	New (%)		N. ^b	Average Ages at Succ.	Average Posit. Age ^c
Cameroon	16- 5-60	20	12 (60)	8 (40)		18	39.1	1.6
CAR	19- 8-60	11	9 (81)	2 (19)		10	33.5	1.4
Chad	24- 8-60	16	14 (87)	2 (13)		15	34.4	1.1
Congo/Brazza.	23-11-60	14	13 (92)	1 (8)		14	39.3	1.6
Dahomey	1- 1-60	13	11 (85)	2 (15)		12	47.1	3.2
Gabon	9-11-60	12	8 (66)	4 (34)		11	39.5	2.0
Guinea	7-10-58	17	10 (58)	7 (42)		16	38.4	0.7
Ivory Coast	3- 1-61	15	12 (80)	3 (20)		15	43.3	1.4
Mali	20- 1-61	16	12 (75)	4 (25)		15	36.5	1.6
Mauritania	29- 9-61	11	7 (63)	4 (37)		11	35.4	2.5
Niger	31-12-60	14	12 (85)	2 (15)		13	44.2	2.6
Senegal	7- 9-60	17	10 (58)	7 (42)		17	43.9	2.2
Togo	18- 6-59	9	7 (77)	2 (23)		9	49.1	1.4
Upper Volta	1- 1-61	13	11 (84)	2 (16)		12	46.8	2.8
Totals and Cumul. Averages		198	148 (75)	50 (24.9)		188	41.75	2.1

Notes to Table 7:

a. Cabinets composed immediately before independence and which became the governments of the new states, or those composed almost immediately after independence, which became governments.

b. N = ministers on whom age data were available.

c. Years in cabinet-level posts. The first African governments in most of these states were formed in 1957, in the wake of the so-called "loi-cadre reforms."

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TABLE 8

Independence Cabinets:
Educational Attainment

Country	No. Posts	N ^a	N= Higher (%)	N= Secondary (%)	N= Primary (%)	Little or None	Wm. Ponty
Cameroon	20	18	2 (11)	13 (72)	3 (17)	--	--
CAR	11	11	2 (18)	9 (81)	0	--	--
Chad	16	16	1 (06)	10 (62)	5 (32)	--	1
Congo/Brazza.	14	14	2 (14)	8 (57)	4 (29)	--	1
Dahomey	13	13	9 (69)	4 (30)	0	--	--
Gabon	12	12	1 (08)	4 (33)	6 (59)	1	1
Guinea	17	16	7 (43)	6 (37)	3 (20)	--	6
Ivory Coast	15	15	9 (60)	4 (26)	2 (14)	--	3
Mali	16	16	10 (62)	6 (37)	0	--	4
Mauritania	11	11	2 (18)	7 (64)	2 (18)	--	4
Niger	14	14	1 (7)	10 (71)	3 (22)	--	4
Senegal	17	17	9 (52)	8 (47)	0	--	5
Togo	9	9	4 (44)	4 (44)	1 (12)	--	1
Upper Volta	13	11	3 (27)	6 (54)	2 (18)	--	1
Totals	198	193	62 (31)	100 (53)	31 (16)	1	31 (16)

Note to Table 8:

a. N = ministers on whom educational data were available.

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kind to men with higher education. Only 31% of the total completed higher educational institutions; the bulk of the cabinet officers (53%) only completed secondary schools. Although the computations do not appear here, there is also a strong correlation between age and education. The tendency seemed to be that the older the cabinet officer, the less well-educated (i.e., secondary or less as the highest level of attainment), the younger, the better-educated (university, professional, post-secondary training, or bachot). Finally, though the figures are only marginally interesting, the "old school tie" of the Ecole Normale William Ponty, near Dakar, kept recurring. Thirty-one (16%) had attended William Ponty, for most of which (20) the school provided terminal education. The Ponty graduates, further, were almost all in the middle-age range (36-46).

It was suggested earlier that, from the evidence, the 47 African "founding fathers" appeared to be, by and large, men better suited to operate within the colonial system that produced them than to overthrow it. A study focussing on legislatures in French-speaking Africa, based on data similar to that used here, arrived at the same conclusion about the deputies composing the so-called "independence" parliaments.²⁵ Not only do the educational data on the "founding father" cabinets (displayed in Table 9) appear to replicate those findings, but the percentages of the major aggregate categories are extremely close to those derived in the legislatures study. In the cabinets, 30.5% of the ministers had been civil servants, the percentage was 33.3 for the legislators; 21.7% of the cabinet officers had been educators, 22.2% of the legislators; 17.1% of the cabinet officers had begun their careers from public health occupations, 13.1% of the legislators had similar backgrounds. (N in the legislatures study was 444 deputies in 7 parliaments.) The cabinet officers shared still another characteristic with their legislative contemporaries: some 70% of the legislators had occupational backgrounds that put them partially or wholly under the rubric of government-employed (generally, the first four categories in Table 9); 151 of the 193 cabinet officers (78.2%) had had similar backgrounds. The point need not be belabored: the "establishmentarians" predominated in the cabinets, as they had in the legislatures and among the "founding fathers" throughout the continent.

Table 9 indicates that the cabinets contained a relatively large number of doctors (22) and half that many lawyers. A few comments on these figures are in order. The medical men in question were here lumped together for purposes of analysis, but the category "doctors" in fact breaks down to 14 medical doctors (with French university degrees) and 8 médecins Africains (graduates of the African School of Medicine and Pharmacy in Dakar, whose skills and training approximated those of a male nurse in the U.S.). That so large a number of "doctors" should find their way to political office is hardly surprising in the African context. Of all the professional mysteries of the White Man, those of the healer have seemed at once the most powerful and awesome, and when an African penetrated those mysteries, his prestige and skills became important political assets.²⁶ Doctors have, in Africa, often used the leverage of their prestige and status to launch political careers. Milton Margai parlayed a backwoods medical career into the Prime Ministership of Sierra Leone; President Houphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast, East Cameroon Premier Simon-Pierre Tchoungui, and President Hastings Banda of Malawi all rose to political prominence from the springboard of medicine. It even

TABLE 9

Occupational Backgrounds of Independence^a Cabinets^b (N = 193/199)

Occupational Categories ^c (Collapsed)	(N:193)												% of N by Categories		
	Cam	CAR	Chad	C/B	Dah	Gab	Guin	IVC	Mali	Maur	Nig	Sen		Togo	UV
Administration	12	5	3	5	4	7	3	4	6	3	3	1	6	59	30.5
Education	1	4	2	2	4	4	2	3	3	6	6	6	3	42	21.7
Public Health															
a. Doctors	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	5	1	1	2	2	1	22	11.4)
b. Pub. Health Wkrs.			3	2							2	2	1	5	2.6)
c. Veterinarians	1					1	1	1			2	1		6	3.1)
Law					2	1	2	2	1		3			11	5.7
"Intellectual" pursuits					1	1	1				1			3	1.5
Private economy															
a. Commerce & Industry	1	1	1	1	1	3	2			1			1	2	13
b. Agriculture			1	1									1		3
Chiefs, traditional and modern	4		1							2				7	6.7)
Trade Union Leaders			1	1	1	1	1				2	1		8	3.6
Politicians	1		1											2	4.1
Engineers, Scientific personnel				1	1		2	2	1					7	1.0
Other			1		1	1	1			1			1	5	3.6
															2.6

Sources: See Annex C.

Notes to Table 9:

- a. See Note 1, Table 7.
- b. Figures given for cabinet officers on which data was available.
- c. The categories are adapted from those used by Jean-Louis Seurin, "Elites Sociales et Partis Politiques d'A.O.F.," Annales Africaines (University of Dakar) 1958; 123-57. They include the following occupations:
 - "Administration": civil servants, clerks, agents, secretaries, etc., both territorial and municipal
 - "Education": professeurs, teachers, moniteurs, titulaires, headmasters, etc.
 - "Public Health": M.D.'s, "African Doctors," Veterinary Doctors, Male Nurses, pharmacists; medical, dental, and veterinary assistants
 - "Intellectual Pursuits": journalists, poets, writers, playwrights
 - "Law": lawyers, magistrates, judges, bailiffs
 - "Commerce and Industry": merchants, traders, businessmen, transporters; business clerks, accountants, agents; auctioneers, appraisers
 - "Agriculture": traditional chiefs, chefs de canton, emirs, lamidos, laouanes, paramount chiefs, wazirs, marabouts, notables, etc.
 - "Engineers, Scientific": Railway, Chemical Civil, Refrigeration, and Communication, Engineers; ethnologists, agronomists, broadcasters, meteorologists
 - "Other": military men, veterans, priests, interpreters, theatrical impressarios

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appears sometimes that doctors were deemed political prizes of great value, a value far surpassing that of their medical expertise. The January, 1961, Mali cabinet, an extreme example, contained no less than five doctors, only one of whom exercised functions having anything directly to do with health.*

*Somine Dolo, M.D., was Minister of Public Health; Seydou Badian Kouyaté, M.D., occupied the post of Minister of Rural Economy and the Plan; Abdoulaye Sinagré, m.A. (médecin Africain), was Minister of Education; Henri Corenthin, M.D., was Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications; and Ousmane Bâ, m.A., was Minister of Public Services and Social Legislation.

The small number of lawyers on the "independence" cabinets is probably due more to the structure of French legal education than to a lack of lawyers from which to choose cabinet officers. Our category "law" includes practicing lawyers, judges, magistrates, members of the procuracy; it excludes those individuals who have a "law" degree, usually a license from a faculty of law in some French university, and who subsequently went into civil service or other occupations. The holders of licenses or doctorats in law are numerous in France and Africa simply because the faculties of law in many French universities include a great many social sciences and other curricula usually separated in American colleges. Those degrees need not necessarily, therefore, lead their possessors to the practice of law; the majority do not in fact do so, usually preferring instead to enter the ranks of government bureaucracies.

B. The Incumbents: Cabinets, 1968 and 1974

The cabinets to be discussed in this section are those in office on June 1, 1968, and November 30, 1974. The 1974 data take into account the most recent changes and are, for that reason, much less complete than those on the "founding father" or the 1968 cabinets. The largest gaps in the 1974 data occur for Congo/Brazzaville and Guinea where, due to the recency of the changes or a lack of sources, data were unavailable on new cabinet officers. The fourteen "1974 incumbents" cabinets comprised 297 positions. Age data were only available on 229 (77%) of this group; most of the gaps (38 positions) were in the data on the two countries named above, and they were omitted from our analysis of age factors. The gaps also made it necessary, in the analysis of educational background, to omit these two states and, in the analysis of occupational background, to omit Guinea. The 1974 aggregates, both numerical and percentaged, are therefore advanced with considerable caution, and the conclusions drawn from them and from comparisons to be made between them and the other incumbents, all "successors," and "founding father" cabinets can only be considered tentative. The 1968 figures, however, cover nearly all (95%) of the "1968 incumbents" and are advanced with fewer reservations.

The average age in 1968 of all incumbents for whom age data were available (200 of 210) was 40.7 years, some nine years less than the all-African average for the same year (Table 6), and almost the same as the average for the same year (Table 6), but almost the same as the average for the "founding father" cabinets (41.75). Among the

"1968 incumbent" ministers were 50 who had served on "founding father" cabinets, plus 160 who could be legitimately called "successors," having followed "founding fathers" in office. Average age for the remaining "founding fathers" in this group was 48.8; the "successors" averaged 41.9. The age gap is 6.9 years, not an inconsiderable span, given the relative newness of the states concerned. By 1974, in the 14 states, the number of "founding fathers" had been reduced to 22 (17 in the 12 states on which age data were available), but in other respects the aggregate figures resembled those of 1968: the average age (12 states) was 41.2; all "successors" averaged 40.8 years, and the remaining "founding fathers" averaged 51.3. A comparison of the "1968 incumbents" and "founding father" cabinets suggests the extent to which the "founding fathers" were responding to the demands of the younger elite for an increased share in national decision-making. The demand is--and was--demonstrably there. Of interest is the response of the older generation of leaders. The proportion of "successors" in those cabinets not completely turned over by a coup or crisis was already significant in 1968; it had increased considerably by 1974. In 1968, at least, most of the "successors" were men in their thirties and early forties. The 1974 data (Table 10), however, conceal an interesting point that emerged from detailed examination of the cabinets themselves: in the 12 states, 43 of the 239 cabinet officers were men over 50 years old, a number almost double that of the remaining "founding fathers." What appears to have happened is that older men, many of them with extensive experience in the bureaucracy or the dominant political party, have been drawn into cabinets. Why? The Ivory Coast, which has eight 50+ cabinet ministers (only half of which are "founding fathers"), suggests one answer. There, given increasing fusion between the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire and the government and a consequent interchangeability of roles between the two, the regime has simply drawn upon its own faithful to man top positions rather than give them to younger technocrats. This may, perhaps, also suggest an attempt to reinforce the ruling oligarchy in the face of insistent demands for basic political change voiced by members of the younger elite.²⁷ Overall, however, excluding those cabinets wholly composed of "successors"--Upper Volta, Dahomey, Congo/Brazzaville, and Togo, where coups displaced a "founding father" regime--as well as that of the Central African Republic, where two "founding father" ministers were retained by a successor regime, the 1968 and 1974 data suggest that Presidents Tombalbaye (Chad), Ahidjo (Cameroon), and Senghor (Senegal) have been unusually responsive to the problem posed by the political generational gap. The same thing can be said of the late President M'Ba of Gabon, whose hand-picked successor was 33 at

TABLE 10

"Incumbents" Cabinets:
Gross Turnover, Age, Generational Gap Index

A. "1968 Incumbents" (at 6-1-68)

Country	Mo., Yr.	No.	Founding	Suc-		Avg. Age	Avg. Pos.	%	Gen.
	Formed	Posts	Fathers	cessors	N ^a =	in 1968	1968	Suc-cessors	Gap Index ^b
Cameroon	3-68	17	5	12	17	41.7	5.1	72.2	11.9
CAR	2-68	14	2	12	14	38.1	2.7	85.7	9.4
Chad	10-66	16	1	15	16	35.9	3.4	93.7	--
Congo/Brazza.	1-68	13	0	13	10	35.9	2.7	100.0	--
Dahomey	12-67	11	0	11	9	32.3	0.45	100.0	--
Gabon	1-68	20	2	18	19	40.7	2.9	90.0	9.2
Guinea	1-68	14	6	8	14	45.3	6.7	57.1	2.3
Ivory Coast	12-67	19	5	14	19	45.2	5.4	73.7	11.9
Mali	3-68	15	9	6	13	44.4	7.5	40.3	6.1
Mauritania	6-67	14	6	8	13	37.6	6.8	57.1	7.3
Niger	11-65	14	7	7	14	47.6	7.1	50.0	6.0
Senegal	6-68	17	7	10	16	47.9	7.3	58.8	4.0
Togo	4-67	12	0	12	12	37.8	0.75	100.0	--
Upper Volta	6-67	13	0	13	13	40.4	1.3	100.0	--
Totals		210	50	160	200	40.7	4.3	--	7.56

B. "1974 Incumbents" (at 11-30-74)

Cameroon	7-72	30	3	27	26	42.7	6.5	90.0	7.8
CAR	5-74	20	0	20	18	41.0	4.9	100.0	--
Chad	10-74	19	2	17	18	38.0	5.2	89.4	9.1
Dahomey	10-74	14	0	14	11	37.5	1.7	100.0	--
Gabon	7-74	34	2	32	30	40.2	5.1	94.1	16.2
Ivory Coast	7-74	26	5	21	25	45.0	7.2	80.7	18.3
Mali	5-73	14	0	14	14	38.2	3.0	100.0	--
Mauritania	12-72	16	2	14	16	40.0	4.8	87.5	9.1
Niger	6-74	15	0	15	12	40.1	0	100.0	--
Senegal	4-73	22	3	19	21	47.6	4.6	86.3	12.9
Togo	8-73	14	0	14	14	40.9	4.7	100.0	--
Upper Volta	2-74	15	0	15	15	44.2	2.2	100.0	--
Congo/Brazza.	8-73	16	0	16	8	n.d. ^c	n.d.	100.0	--
Guinea	6-72	42	5	37	12	n.d.	n.d.	88.0	n.d.
Totals		297	22	275	229	41.28 (N= 12)	4.15 (N= 12)	--	12.2

Sources: See Annex C.

Notes to Table 10:

- a. Number of cabinet officers on whom age data were available.
- b. Generational Gap Index= mean age "FF" minus mean age "SS." The figure becomes more significant in light of the fact that 43 of the ministers in the first 12 cabinets of part B were men over 50. See text for further comment.
- c. n. d. = insufficient data for a computation.

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succession and headed a cabinet including six men in their thirties. If the percentage of successors in both 1968 and 1974 "incumbent" cabinets is also compared to the average age of the "successors" therein, the age difference takes on a somewhat different dimension: the younger "successors" have found their way in greater proportions into the Chad, Mauritanian, and Cameroon cabinets, though the total number of successors in the latter two cabinets is less than in some of the others.

It would be interesting to speculate upon the political future of the governments of Presidents Houphouet Boigny, Ahidjo, and Touré, all of whom have continued to rely heavily on their older colleagues, and conversely, to wonder if having a large number of younger leaders in a cabinet constitutes some sort of investment to insure either their continued tenure or peaceful succession. There is simply not enough evidence to permit even an educated guess at present. It is possible that the generational gap often may not have a great deal to do with succession at the top or within ministerial cabinets. This much can be said: the gap does exist, it does pose political problems (real or imagined) for the "founding fathers," and, possibly as a result, some of the "founding fathers" have been recruiting younger leaders into their cabinets in increasingly larger numbers.

Table 11 displays the educational attainment of the 1968 and 1974 "incumbent" cabinets. Overall, the ministers appear much better educated than those composing the "independence" cabinets; almost 70% of the 1968 group and 84% of the 1974 group had finished some variety of post-secondary schooling. The comparative increase in the percentage is due almost wholly to the presence of "successors" with better educations. One set of data, particularly, reinforce this point. Comparing the "founding father" and "1974 incumbent" cabinets with respect to licenses, doctorates, and professional degrees (or their equivalents), the former group comprises 35 (18.1% of the 193 on whom educational

TABLE 11

"Incumbents" Cabinets: Educational Attainment

A. "1968 Incumbents"

Country	N=	University ^a	Post-Secondary ^b	Secondary ^c	Primary	Ecole Wm. Ponty
Cameroon	17/17	9	2	5	1	0
CAR	14/14	7	3	4	0	0
Chad	16/16	11	2	3	0	1
Congo/Brazza.	13/13	8	2	3	0	0
Dahomey	9/11	4	3	2	0	0
Gabon	20/20	7	2	11	0	0
Guinea	14/14	5	4	3	2	3
Ivory Coast	19/19	12	3	3	1	3
Mali	15/15	12	2	1	0	3
Mauritania	13/14	6	2	5	0	0
Niger	13/14	2	3	7	1	4
Senegal	16/17	10	3	3	0	4
Togo	12/12	6	0	6	0	0
Upper Volta	13/13	5	5	3	0	0
Totals & % N	204/210	104 (50.9)	36 (17.6)	59 (28.9)	5 (2.4)	18 (8.8)

B. "1974 Incumbents"

Cameroon	26/30	18	5	3	0	0
CAR	18/20	11	4	3	0	0
Chad	18/19	9	5	4	0	0
Gabon	30/34	16	9	5	0	0
Ivory Coast	25/26	19	4	2	0	3
Mali	14/14	7	5	2	0	0
Mauritania	16/16	12	3	1	0	3
Niger	12/15	5	4	3	0	0
Senegal	21/22	15	3	3	0	2
Togo	14/14	9	3	2	0	0
Dahomey	11/14	6	3	2	0	0
Upper Volta	15/15	6	5	4	0	0
Totals & % N	220/239	133 (60.4)	53 (23.6)	34 (15.4)	0	8 (3.6)

Sources: See Annex C.

Notes to Table 11:

- a. Or the equivalent, such as one of the French grands écoles.
- b. Post-secondary technical, diploma, etc., courses, including military schools below the collegiate level.
- c. Up to and including the baccalauréat; also included are non-bachot technical schools, seminaries, etc.

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TABLE 12
Education of Cabinet Officers, Compared

Highest Level Attained ^a	Founding Fathers (N= 193/199)	All Successors ^b (N= 311/365)	1968 Incumbents (N= 204/210)	1974 Incumbents (N= 220/239)
University or Post-grad.	62 (32.1)	173 (55.6)	104 (50.9)	133 (60.4)
Post-secondary	16 (8.3)	64 (20.5)	36 (17.6)	53 (23.6)
Secondary	84 (43.5)	69 (22.1)	59 (28.9)	34 (15.4)
Primary	31 (16.0)	5 (1.6)	5 (2.4)	0

Sources: See Annex C.

Notes to Table 12:

- a. See notes to Table 11 for explanation of these categories.
- b. "Successors" in the 1968 and 1974 cabinets only. No name is counted twice, however. Approximately 900 "successors" have occupied cabinet posts in the fourteen countries since the first "independence" cabinets were formed. Inasmuch as biographical material is available on only about 650 of the 900--more accurately, is complete on our principal points of comparison--it was decided to use only the two sets above.

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data were available), while the latter, 66 (30% of the 220 on whom data were available). The difference is accounted for wholly by "successors."

The percentage of those who had only completed secondary and primary schooling declined considerably, again evidence for the fact that increasing numbers of better educated and more highly qualified men were being recruited to cabinet positions. Table 12 summarizes those data. The data on occupational background (Tables 13 and 14) confirm this tendency, though some interesting changes appear to have taken place since independence.

Most visible of these changes is the advent of the military men who, in the wake of coups in Dahomey, Togo, Upper Volta, the Central African Republic, Congo/Brazzaville, and Niger have assumed ministerial posts. There were none in the independence cabinets; in 1968 they manned 12.7% of the posts, and by 1974, that percentage had increased to 21.4 of the portfolios. However, in 1966 they had 21% of the posts, and in 1970, 17%. This fluctuation in the percentage is due, of course, to the recruitment of technocrats and senior administrators into governments ruled by the military, a development itself probably related to the usual pattern whereby these regimes "settle in" and gain confidence in themselves the longer they stay in power. Initially, after a coup, the military regimes tend to operate as juntas, through some sort of collective executive, or simply fill all top positions with military or police officers. Gradually, civilians--most often first those with technical expertise--enter these cabinets. For example, by 1974 the Togolese government (which came to power in 1967) had only two military men left in the cabinet, one of which was President Eyadema. To be sure, some military governments appear to be less secure than others and may shuttle civilians in and out of the cabinet at a rapid pace. The regime of Major Mathieu Kerekou (Dahomey), which dates from October, 1972, had some dozen civilians in and out of the cabinet between the date of the coup and November 30, 1974.

Less visible, though of equal importance, is the shift to the apparent recruitment of increasing numbers of technically-trained individuals, notably in the categories of "administration" (35% and 42%, as against 30.5% in the "founding father" cabinets), "engineers and scientific personnel" (4.3% and 4.8% as against 3.6% in the "independence" ministries). Other categories have remained relatively stable, including "education." The stability of this latter category appears related to a development noted earlier: the recruitment of older party

TABLE 13

Occupational Backgrounds of "1968 Incumbents" Cabinets (N= 206/210)

Occupational Categories ^a (Collapsed)	Cam	CAR	Chad	C/B	Dah	Gab	Guin	IVC	Mali	Maur	Nig	Sen	Togo	UV	Total	% of N by Categories
Administration	11	6	7	3	1	8	5	5	4	7	1	8	5	3	74	35.9
Education	2	3	4	4		5	2	3	4	1	7	5	1	1	42	20.4
Public Health																
a. Doctors			1	1	1	1	2	3	4		1	1	1		15	7.3)
b. Pub. Health Wkrs.					2					1	1				4	1.9) 11.6
c. Veterinarians			1					1	1	1	1	1		1	5	2.4)
Law	3		2		1	1	1	3		3		1	1		15	7.3
"Intellectual" pursuits						1									1	.48
Private economy																
a. Commerce & Industry																
b. Agriculture				1			1				2				4	1.9
Chiefs, traditional and modern	1										2				3	1.4
Trade Union Leaders			1	1			1	2							5	2.4
Politicians															0	--
Engineers, Scientific personnel													1		10	4.8
Security Forces																
a. Military		4		1	9								4	8	26	12.6)
b. Police		1				1									2	.96) 12.7

Sources: See Annex C.

Note to Table 13: a. For explanation of categories, see Note 3, Table 9.

TABLE 14

Occupational Backgrounds of "1974 Incumbents" Cabinets

Occupational Categories ^a (Collapsed)	Cam CAR Chad C/B Dah Gab IVC Mali Maur Nig Sen Togo UV											Totals	% of N by Categories	
	12	9	7	7	20	12	6	4	2	14	6	99	42.4	
Administration	4	4	3	1	3	3	1	6	3	2	30	12.8		
Education														
Public Health														
a. Doctors			1		2	3	1				7	3.0)		
b. Pub. Health Wkrs.	2		1	1	1				1		6	2.5)	6.4	
c. Veterinarians	2										2	0.8)		
Law	4	2	2			3	1	3	1	2	18	7.7		
"Intellectual" pursuits	2	1			1	1			1	1	7	3.0		
Private economy														
a. Commerce & Industry			2			2					4	1.7)	.1	
b. Agriculture			1								1	0.4)		
Chiefs, traditional and modern											0	--		
Trade Union Leaders											0	--		
Politicians			1					1			2	0.8		
Engineers, Scientific personnel	1			1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	10	4.3	
Security Forces														
a. Military	1				14		6		11		2	14	20.6)	21.4
b. Police					1						1	2	0.8)	

Sources: See Annex C.

Note to Table 14: a. For explanation of categories, see Note 3, Table 9.

leaders and politicians, many of whom had once been educators, to cabinets in states where party and government have virtually merged. If "military and police" are included under the rubric of technically-trained, as they probably ought to be, then the trend becomes quite obvious. The category "public health" also declined by comparison. This is probably due to an increase in both the overall numbers of medical personnel available for medical positions and technically-trained people available for service as heads of such ministries as agriculture, economic development, labor, public health, education, etc. A good many of the doctors, it seems, have returned to their practices or taken medically-related posts at lower levels.

C. The Impact of Major Succession Events on Ministerial Cabinets

Ten of the fourteen states under discussion have experienced major succession events. In only two of the ten were those events of a peaceful, constitutionally-sanctioned character--the succession of President Albert Bongo following the death of Leon M'Ba, and the change in the structures of government and cabinet following the creation of the Federal Republic of Cameroon in 1961 and again in 1972, following creation of the United Republic of Cameroon. The other events include coups in the Central African Republic, Niger, Mali, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Togo, and Congo/Brazzaville, plus the violent elimination contest between President Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia in Senegal, which was won by the former. All these events were occasions for or were followed by changes in the composition of the ministerial cabinets of countries concerned. Two questions occur: (1) what changes took place within the cabinets after these events? and (2) how do these changes appear when viewed over time?

The answers to these questions, given the gaps in the data and the fact that the analysis deals with only one class of cabinet changes (those following major succession crises of events), must be, again, tentative and rather impressionistic. This loss in reliability suggests that the discussion cover only highlights and that the tabular form of presenting the data be avoided here. Age, education, and previous occupation remain, as before, the principal data points, with personnel turnover as an added dimension.

First, the obvious, or near-obvious, changes. The occasions for the greatest cabinet turnover have been, in every instance, the violent, "irregular" succession events. A change in head of state or government thus brought about almost invariably was accompanied by a massive cabinet housecleaning. Nine examples (listed in rough order

of the most to the least thorough personnel turnover) serve to make the point:

1. Upper Volta cabinet, after the Lamizana coup: 11 new ministers, 0 holdovers (constituted April 1966)*
2. Dahomeyan cabinet, after the Alley-Kouandété coup: 11 new ministers, 0 holdovers (constituted 12-21-67)
3. Togolese cabinet, after the Eyadema coup: 12 new ministers, 0 holdovers (constituted 4-15-67)
4. Centrafrique (CAR) cabinet, after Bokassa coup: 13 new ministers, 2 "founding fathers" (constituted January 1966)
5. Togolese cabinet, after the Olympio assassination: 7 new ministers, 2 holdovers, 2 "founding fathers" (constituted 5-14-63)
6. Congo/Brazzaville cabinet, after the downfall of Youlou regime: 7 new ministers, 2 "founding fathers" (constituted December 1963)
7. Dahomeyan cabinet, following the third Soglo coup: 7 new ministers, 3 holdovers, 2 "founding fathers" (constituted December 1965)
8. Dahomeyan cabinet, after the 1963-64 Soglo interregnum: 5 new ministers, 6 "founding fathers" (constituted February 1964)
9. Senegalese cabinet, after the abortive coup by Mamadou Dia: 8 new ministers, 2 holdovers, 9 "founding fathers" (constituted 12-18-62)

A second point that emerges from the data is not so obvious. Surprisingly, the average age of nine of the fourteen 1968 cabinets was higher--from 1.1 to 9.2 years--than that of the same countries' "founding father" cabinets. In the remaining five states, "incumbent" cabinets were younger by the same comparison. The crucial difference appeared to be, in every case save two (Gabon and the CAR), the presence of a sufficiently large number of "founding fathers" in the "incumbent" cabinets to push the average age up rather than down. The Gabonese case is explained by the fact that President Bongo chose to

*Holdover: a minister held over from a previous cabinet (or cabinets), but who does not fall under the rubric "founding father" as it was used here. All holdovers would, therefore, also fall within the "successor" category. The second (1974) Lamizana coup was as thorough as the first: all the civilians were removed and all 15 posts filled with military men.

retain 12 ministers from his predecessor's cabinet. Two of these were "founding fathers," the rest had been around in M'Ba's cabinets on the average of five years. In any case, the difference in average age of the Gabonese "founding father" and "incumbent" cabinets is only 1.1 years, a difference without much distinction. A comparison of the occupational backgrounds of the ministers in these two cabinets confirms the suspicion that they were pretty much alike in most descriptive respects. The CAR case is harder to explain. There the difference is 4.5 years. Without going into detail, what probably accounts for the higher age average is the fact that, unlike all the coups in French-speaking Africa, the young intellectuals and leaders most likely to have profited from Bokassa's coup were on the losing side. Several of them were implicated in an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the Dacko government with the help of the resident Communist Chinese Embassy, a conspiracy that Bokassa himself claimed to have nipped in the bud by his intervention. It was not surprising, therefore, that Bokassa's first cabinet was composed of five military men and eleven civilians, only four of which latter group were in their thirties.²⁸

In the five states in which the average age of the ministers declined between "founding father" and "incumbent" cabinets, in four (Congo/Brazzaville, Dahomey, Togo, and Upper Volta) that decline is related to the scope of the turnovers following military coups in those countries. In these cases all (Dahomey, Upper Volta, Togo) or all save one "founding father" (Congo/Brazzaville) were ultimately eliminated from the cabinets.

A similar set of observations can be made about a comparison between the average ages of the "1974 incumbents" and "founding father" cabinets. (Here, for reasons noted earlier, Guinea and Congo/Brazzaville are left out of the analysis.) Of the dozen 1974 sets used in the comparison, seven averaged higher in age in 1974 than they did at independence. In four of the seven 1974 cabinets (Cameroon, Chad, Mauritania, and Senegal), the higher average ages (ranging from .7 to 4.6 years) can be explained by the presence of "founding fathers" plus the recruitment of very senior administrators and technicians. The other three in this group are Gabon, the CAR, and Mali. The explanations for Gabon and CAR (with respect to their 1968 cabinets) still hold true in 1974, and in Mali, the small difference (an average 1.7 years older in 1974) is accounted for by the recruitment of older bureaucrats into that cabinet. The five remaining 1974 cabinets averaged from 2.6 to 9.6 years younger than their "founding father" counterparts. In four of the cases (Upper Volta, Togo, Niger, and Dahomey) the difference

is due again to the scope of the turnover from civilian to military regimes, and in the fifth, Ivory Coast, the difference stems from the entrance of a number of relatively young men into some of the junior cabinet posts. Not even the presence in the Ivory Coast of five "founding fathers" (average age, 61) could offset the impact of over a dozen younger men (between 35 and 39).

Finally the available data suggest that changes in the other characteristics (educational level, occupational background) occasioned by cabinet turnover following major succession events followed the general trends suggested in Section B, above, save that the coups appeared to have accelerated them. Again, those trends were in the direction of the recruitment of increasing numbers of men with better educational qualifications as well as higher levels of technical competence.

Conclusions

1. In French-speaking Africa, as for the all-African sample, the "founding fathers" conform to an "establishmentarian" rather than a "revolutionary" image. By and large, they were solid men, well-educated, with political careers built on relatively stable professional foundations.

2. Like the all-African leaders, French-speaking African "founding father" ministers entered politics at relatively young ages--in their early forties. On the average their successors followed this pattern, with the conspicuous exception of some military cabinets composed mainly of men in their thirties.

3. The trend noted in our examination of all-African "incumbent" and "successor" leaders seems to find expression in French-speaking Africa: an increasing number--by now a clear majority--of men in top leadership positions are characterized by relative youth, better education, and higher levels of technical competence than was the case with their predecessors. The differences, save in the category of the military, appear to be differences of an unspectacular degree, and do not, in any case, suggest the arrival of a new managerial elite to power. The continued presence of numbers of "founding fathers" in cabinets, as well as others with extremely varied backgrounds, is evidence to that point.

4. Evidence of a generational gap of some importance still exists, but contradictory cases make generalization difficult. On the one hand, in some states ageing "founding father" leaders have taken

steps that suggest sensitivity to the demands of younger members of the elite for access to power. On the other hand, the response of other "founding fathers" still in power seems to be to reinforce their positions by lateral recruitment of reliable members of their own generation.

5. The military have taken power some dozen times in seven of the fourteen states of our French-speaking African group. However, with the exception of Dahomey (with no less than five coups), a trend to increasing military intervention is difficult to see. This is not to say that a number of the fourteen are not vulnerable to such intervention. In fact, attempted military coups have been reported from Guinea, Senegal, Chad, and even the Ivory Coast. A discussion of this matter, however, is not germane to our present argument.

FOOTNOTES

1. John H. Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," World Politics, IX (1957), reprinted in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 80-86. The quote is at p. 86.
2. Among the relatively few examples of this literature are the following: "Statesmen and Succession," special issue of the Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (1964); Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Chapters 4-7 in Duncan MacRae, Jr., Parliament, Parties, and Society in France 1946-1958 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967); Maxwell E. Knight, The German Executive (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press for the Hoover Institution, 1952); Hannelore Gerstein and Hartmut Schellhoss, "Die Bonner Exekutive/Eine Sozialstatistik der Bundeskabinette 1949-63," in Wolfgang Zapf, ed., Beitraege zur Analyse der deutschen Oberschicht (Munich: Piper Co., 1965); Mattei Dogan, "Political Ascent in a Class Society: French Deputies 1870-1958," and W.L. Guttsman, "Changes in British Labour Leadership," both in Dwaine Marvick, ed., Political Decision-makers (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961). Two articles dealing with Africa are: Ladun Anise, "Trends in Leadership Succession and Regime Change in African Politics Since Independence," (unpub. paper, 15th Annual Meeting, African Studies Association, Philadelphia, 1972); and Victor T. Le Vine, "Problems of Political Succession in Independent Africa," in Ali A. Mazrui and Hasu Patel, eds., Africa in World Affairs: the Next Thirty Years (New York: The Third Press, 1973), pp. 79-103.
3. Charles L. Taylor and Michael G. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2d. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).
4. Anise, op. cit., p. 8
5. See Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the

New States of Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review, LXII, No. 1 (March, 1968); Zolberg's footnotes contain a number of excellent references to published materials on the more important succession events. The articles by René Lemarchand, Michael Lofchie, Crawford Young, James O'Connell, Victor Le Vine, and Ali A. Mazrui in Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, eds., Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 877-1087, all deal with aspects of succession events and crises.

6. The term "father of his country" is not infrequently used to describe various African leaders. I have seen it used in connection with Jomo Kenyatta, Sékou Touré, Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, among others. Whatever the pretensions of the term, it does seem accurate if the role of many "founding fathers" in the achievement of independence for their countries is considered.
7. The period of dyarchy usually lasted three years, from 1957 to 1960, in the French-speaking African states. During this period France, in effect, shared power with local governments. The nature of that relationship is detailed by Ruth Schachter Morgenthau in her Political Parties in French-speaking West Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 61-74.
8. For a discussion of educational policies and institutions in French-speaking Africa, see Jerry B. Boligaugh and Paul R. Hanna, Education as an Instrument of National Policy in Newly Developing Nations: French Educational Strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa... (Stanford: Comparative Education Center, 1964). A fine case study--Ivory Coast--of the nature and impact of the French educational présence is Remi Clignet and Philip Foster's The Fortunate Few (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).
9. Le Vine, Political Leadership in Africa, op. cit., pp. 12-18.
10. In particular, graduates from the Ecole Normale William Ponty. Morgenthau, op. cit., discussed the role of the Ponty graduates in French West African politics, pp. 13-16.
11. See Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Political Careers and Party

Leadership, " in Edinger, ed., Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967).

12. The list is perhaps incomplete. Zanzibar could be included in this list, as might some of the temporary secessionist states of recent African history: Katanga, Kwilu, Stanleyville, "Peoples' Republic," and Biafra. Though the 1959-60 situations in the Belgian Congo and Rwanda and Burundi were certainly politically tumultuous--even perhaps semi-revolutionary--it could hardly be claimed that the Belgians were forced out by concerted, violent, and single-minded nationalist action.
13. The point takes added meaning when the "founding fathers" are compared to the leaders of Marxist and neo-Marxist parties such as the Union des Populations de Cameroun, the Senegalese Parti d'Indépendance Africaine, and Sawaba.
14. "If the Middle Eastern experience is any guide, the first military coups are likely to come from three to five years after independence....," Dankwart A. Rustow, "Succession in the Twentieth Century," in "Statesmen and Succession," Journal of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 109.
15. All the independent states either have constitutional or statutory provisions for executive succession. It appears, however, that the formal rules for succession exercise little constraint on those willing to resort to coups. In such situations, the rules are suspended, since they almost always get in the way of the realities of political life that dominate the question of succession. My article "Problems of Political Succession..." op. cit., contains summaries of various constitutional provisions for succession in Africa.
16. See John A. Ballard, "Four Equatorial States," in Gwendolen Carter, ed., Nationalism and Unity in Eight African States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 272-274. A more recent report casts additional light on problems in Chad: Philippe Decraene, "Chad at World's End," Africa Report, 13 (January, 1968), p. 54.
17. Victor D. Dubois, "On the Rise of an Opposition to Sékou Touré," American Universities Field Staff Reports Service,

parts 1-5. (Reports dated: 1-March, 1966; 2-March, 1966; 3-March, 1966; 4-April, 1966; 5-April, 1966.)

18. Africa Research Bulletin (Political Social and Cultural Series), Vol. 10, No. 6 (July 15, 1973), p. 2887; also No. 7 (August 15, 1973), p. 2920. Commentary on the plot may be found in Africa Confidential, Vol. 14, no. 15, pp. 5-6.
19. The problem is discussed by John Spencer in his "Kenyatta's Kenya," Africa Report, Vol. 11, no. 5 (May, 1966), pp. 6-14.
20. My field notes gathered in Senegal in the spring of 1965 contain numerous references to this; some of those I interviewed at that time expressed similar sentiments. (Political Leadership in Africa, op. cit.) For additional clues to the prospects of the regime, see William Foltz, "Social Structure and Political Behavior of Senegalese Elites," Behavioral Science Notes, 4 (1969), pp. 145-163.
21. I have noted some of these matters in my The Cameroon Federal Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971).
22. In particular, see James S. Coleman's remarks in Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 674-676.
23. On this point see, generally, R.S. Morgenthau, op. cit., and Guy de Lusignam, French-speaking Africa Since Independence (New York: Praeger, 1969).
24. Also known as the loi Defferre since it was introduced by Gaston Defferre, Minister of Overseas Territories in 1956. Michael Crowder summarized some of its salient points:

The only revolutionary aspect of the loi cadre was its introduction of the concept of responsible self-government at the local territorial level within the framework of the French Union.... The double electoral college was abolished, and universal suffrage was introduced.... The effective Prime Minister of the territory was to be the Vice-President [of the Territorial Council of Ministers, presided over by the resident Governor], who in turn was to be the political

leader commanding a majority in the Assembly.

("Independence as a Goal in French West African Politics," in William H. Lewis, ed., French-speaking Africa. New York: Walker & Co., 1965; p. 29.)

25. Victor T. Le Vine, "Political Elite Recruitment and Political Structure in French-speaking Africa," Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, VIII (1968), No. 3, pp. 369-389.
My N: was 1244 deputies in 25 separate legislatures between 1946 and 1962.
26. The point is underlined in the excellent study by Willy de Craemer and Renée C. Fox, The Emerging Physician: A Sociological Approach to the Development of a Congolese Medical Profession. (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1968.)
27. Le Vine, Political Leadership..., op. cit.
28. See "La République Centrafricaine," Jeune Afrique, No. 309 (December 11, 1966), special section, p. ix, for a discussion of causes and aftermath of the Bokassa coup.

ANNEX A

Leadership Succession in Independent Black Africa*

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of Succ'n.	Age at Succ'n.	Education: Highest Level Attained	Former Occupation	Notes
<u>BOTSWANA (9-30-66)</u>					
FF:					
<u>Pres. Seretse Khama</u> (PM, 1965)	9-66	45	III, S. Africa and U.K.	Attorney, traditional chief	
<u>BURUNDI (7-1-62)</u>					
FF:					
H.S. Mwami Mwambutsa IV	7-62	50	II, Burundi (Astrida)	Traditional chief	Deposed, 7-66
<u>P.M. André Muhirwa</u>	"	46	" "	Traditional chief	Son-in-law of Mwami Mwambutsa
SS:					
P.M. Pierre Ngendandumwe	6-63	31	II, Burundi (Astrida)	Civil Servant	
P.M. Albin Nyamoya	3-64	22	" "	Veterinary assistant	
P.M. P. Ngendandumwe	11-64	32	--	--	Assassinated, 6-65
P.M. Joseph Bamina	6-65	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	
P.M. Léopold Biha	9-65	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	
<u>H.S. Mwami Ntare V</u>	7-66	19	III, Belgium	Crown prince	Deposes father in coup
<u>P.M. Michel Micombero</u>	"	26	II, Burundi, Mil.tg.	Military (Capt.)	Deposes Ntare in coup, 11-28-66
Pres. M. Micombero	11-66	26	" "	"	"

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of		Age at Succ'n.	Education: Highest Level Attained	Former Occupation	Notes
	Succ'n.	Succ'n.				
<u>CAMEROON (Republic, 1-1-60; Federation, 10-1-61; United Republic, 6-1-72)</u>						
FF:						
<u>Pres. Ahmadou Ahidjo</u> (PM, 1958)	1-60	36	II, Cameroon (French)	Civil Servant, radio operator		
V. P. John N. Foncha (PM, So. Cam., 1959)	10-61	45	II, Cameroon (British), Nigeria	Teacher		
SS:						
V. P. Solomon Tandeng Muna	4-70	58	II, teach. tg. (Cameroon); U. London U, teach. dipl.	Teacher		Under const. of United Republic, Office of V. P. eliminated
<u>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (7-13-60)</u>						
FF:						
Pres. David Dacko (PM, 1959)	7-60	30	II, Congo/Brazza., tech. tg.	Teacher		Removed by coup, 1-1-66
SS:						
<u>Pres. Jean Bédel Bokassa</u>	1-66	45	II, CAR, Mil. tg.	Military (Col.)		Promoted to (Field) Marshall, 5-19-74
<u>CHAD (7-11-60)</u>						
FF:						
<u>Pres. (François) Ndjamena</u> <u>Tombalbaye (PM, 1959)</u>	8-60	45	I, Chad	Ass't. teacher, trade union leader		
<u>CONGO (PEOPLE'S) REPUBLIC (8-15-60)</u>						
FF:						
Pres. Foulbert Youlou (PM, 1957)	8-60	43	II and Catholic Seminaries, (Congo/B.)	Priest and teacher		Removed by coup, 3-15-66; died in France, 1972

Mo., Yr. of		Age at	Education: Highest Level Attained		Former Occupation	Notes
Title and Name		Succ'n.	Succ'n.			
CONGO (PEOPLE'S) REPUBLIC (8-15-60) (continued)						
SS:						
Pres. Alphonse Massamba-Débat	3-63	42	II, teach.tg., Congo/B.	Teacher		
P.M. Pascal Lissouba	3-63	32	III, Paris	Agronomist		
P.M. Ambroise Noumazalay	5-66	33	II, Congo/Brazza.	Mathematician, politician		
H.S. and P.M. Alfred Raoul	7-68	38	St. Cyr Mil.Acad., Paris	Military (Capt.)	H.S. until 12-31-68	
H.S. Marien Ngouabi	8-68	30	II, mil. and tech., France	Military (Major)	Displaces Raoul at head of Junta	
<u>Pres. M. Ngouabi</u>	1-69	30	--	--	--	Dismissed 12-16-71
<u>P.M. Alfred Raoul</u>	"	39	--	--	--	Dismissed 8-5-72
V.P. Aloyse Moudileno-Massengo	12-71	38	III, France	Lawyer		
V.P. Ange-Edouard Pongui	8-72	30(?)	III, France	Civil Servant	Lost position in reshuffle, 8-73	
<u>P.M. Henri Lopes</u>	8-73	37	III, Paris	Civil Servant, author		
DAHOMEY (8-1-60)						
FF:						
Pres. Hubert Maga (PM, 1959)	8-60	50	II, Dahomey; Wm. Ponty, Senegal	Teacher, Civil Servant	Removed by coup, October, 1963	
V.P. Sourou Migan Apithy	"	48	III, Paris	Accountant		
SS:						
Pres. Christophe Soglo	10-63	53	II, Dahomey, Mil.tg.	Military (Col.)	Peaceful transfer to civilian regime	
Pres. S. M. Apithy	1-64	51	--	--		
V.P. and P.M. Justin Ahomadegbe	"	47	Dental school, Dakar, Senegal	Dentist		
H.S. J. Ahomadegbe	11-65	48	--	--	Ahomadegbe "dismisses" Apithy	
Pres. Tahiron Congaon	11-65	49	II, Dahomey	Teacher	Assembly Pres.; Provisional Pres.	

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of Succ'n.	Age at Succ'n.	Education:		Former Occupation	Notes
				Highest Level Attained		
DAHOMEY (8-1-60) (continued)						
Pres. C. Soglo	12-65	55	--	--	--	Second Soglo coup
SS: Pres. Alphonse Alley	12-67	37	II, Tech., Mil. sch.		Military (Capt.)	Removes Soglo in coup, 12-17-67
P.M. Maurice Kouandété	"	36	II, tech.mil., France		Military (Col.)	
Pres. Emile Derlin Zinsou	8-68	50	III, Paris		M.D.	Removed by coup, December, 1969
H.S. Paul Emile de Souza	12-69	n.d.	Mil., tech. sch.		Military (Lt. Col.)	Head, 3-man junta
Pres. (1) H. Maga	5-70	60	--		--	Presidential
Pres. (2) J. Ahomadegbe	"	53	--		--	"troika" installed by junta; each Pres. in office 2 yrs.
Pres. (3) S. M. Apithy	"	57	--		--	Kerekou coup ends "troika"
Pres. Mathieu Kerekou	10-72	38	II, Mil., tech. sch.		Military (Maj.)	
EQUATORIAL GUINEA (10-12-68)						
FF: Pres. Francisco Macias Nguéma	10-68	42	II, Rio Muni		Planter	
ETHIOPIA (Independent for centuries)						
FF: H.S. Emp. Haile Selassie	1930	38	Private tutoring		Prince	Deposed by military 9-12-74 (Various prime ministers of which the last two were Lij Endal Kachew Makonnen and Lij Michael Imru Makonnen was executed 11-23-74)a

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of		Age at Succ'n.	Education: Highest Level Attained		Former Occupation	Notes
	Succ'n.						
<u>ETHIOPIA (Independent for centuries) (continued)</u>							
SS:							
Chmn., Mikael Aman Andom ^a	9-74	51	II, Sandhurst mil. coll.	Military	Executed, 11-23-74; said to have been figurehead		
Chmn. Coord. Comm. PMAC, <u>Mengistu Haile Mariam</u>	11-74	36	n. d. (Mil. tg. ?)	Military (Maj.)	Reputed to be (one of) the principal(s) in military junta		
Chmn. PMAC, <u>Teferi Benti</u>	11-74	53	Service-educated; Mil. tg.	Military (Brigadier)	Figurehead?		
<u>GABON (8-17-60)</u>							
FF:							
Pres. Leon M'Ba (PM, 1958)	8-60	58	II, Gabon	Civil Servant			
SS: H.S. and P.M. Jean Hilaire Aubame	2-64	54	I, Gabon	Civil Servant	"3-day" coup, Feb. 18-21, 1964		
	2-64	62	--	--	Returned to power by French		
Pres. and P.M. <u>Albert Bongo</u>	12-67	31	II, tech., Congo/B.	Civil Servant	M'Ba dies, November, 1967, names V.P. Bongo successor in March, 1967		
<u>V. P. Leon Mébame</u>	1-68	34	II, Gabon; police tg., Paris	Policeman			
<u>Dep. V.P. J. Stanislas Migolet</u>	6-71	51	II, Gabon	Civil Servant; administrator			

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of Succ'n.	Age at Succ'n.	Education:		Former Occupation	Notes
			Highest Level Attained			
<u>GAMBIA (2-18-65)</u>						
FF:						
<u>Pres., (P.M.) Dauda Jawara</u>	2-65	41	III, England		Veterinarian	Becomes Pres. in 1970, when Gambia becomes Republic
SS:						
V.P. Sheriff Mustapha Dibba	5-70	33	II, Gambia		Commercial clerk	Resigned 9-15-72
<u>V.P. Andrew David Camara</u>	10-72	49	II, Gambia		Teacher	
<u>GHANA (3-6-57)</u>						
FF:						
Pres. Kwame Nkrumah (LGB, 1951; PM, 1952-61)	3-57	47	III, and post-grad., USA and UK		Teacher, party organizer	Removed by coup, 2-24-66; died 4-28-72
SS:						
H.S. Joseph Ankrah (Chmn.) ^b	2-66	51	II, Ghana; Mil.tg., UK		Military (Lt. Gen.)	National Liberation Council
<u>Vice-Chmn., John K. Harlley</u>	"	47	II, Ghana		Policeman (IGP)	
<u>H.S. Akwasi A. Afrifa</u>	8-69	30	Sandhurst, UK		Military (Brig.)	Took over as Chmn., NLC, became Chmn. of Presidential Comm'n. to 8-7-70
Vice-Chmn. J.K. Harlley	"	47	--		--	
Albert Ocran	"	41	II, Ghana; Mil.tg.		Military (Lt. Gen.)	
<u>P.M. Kofi A. Busia</u>	10-69	56	III, England (Oxford, PhD)		Prof. of Sociology	Removed by coup, 1-15-72
Pres. Edward Akufo-Addo	8-70	64	III, UK (Oxford, London)		Lawyer, jurist	
<u>H.S., Chmn. Ignatius K. Acheampong^b</u>	1-72	40	Mil.tg. (OCS), UK		Military (Col.)	

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of Succ'n.	Age at Succ'n.	Education:		Former Occupation	Notes
			Highest Level Attained			
<u>GUINEA (10-2-58)</u>						
FF:						
<u>Pres. Ahmed Sékou Touré</u>	10-58	36	II and tech., Guinea		Clerk, trade union leader	(3-66 to 4-72 Nkrumah "co-President," but w/o authority)
SS:						
<u>P. M. Louis L. Beavogui</u>	4-72	49	III, Wm. Ponty (med.) Senegal		Medical officer	
<u>GUINEA-BISSAU (proclaimed independence 9-24-73; Final Portuguese withdrawal, 9-8-74)^c</u>						
FF:						
<u>Pres. Luis de Almeida Cabral</u>	(9-73 ((9-74)	42) 43)	II, Guinea-Bissau		Civil Servant (accountant)	Brother of the late Amilcar Cabral, founder of PAIGC party
<u>IVORY COAST (8-7-60)</u>						
FF:						
<u>Pres. Felix Houphouet Boigny (PM, 1958)</u>	8-60	55	III, Wm. Ponty (med.) Senegal		Medical officer, planter	
<u>KENYA (12-12-63)</u>						
FF:						
<u>Pres. Jomo Kenyatta</u>	12-63	70	III, U. London and LSE (PhD Anthro.)		Teacher, publicist, politician	
<u>V. P. Oginga Odinga</u>	"	51	III, Makerere (Uganda)		Teacher, business- man, politician	Forced to resign, April, 1966
SS:						
<u>V. P. Joseph Murumbi</u>	5-66	55	II, India		Businessman	
<u>V. P. Daniel Arap Moi</u>	1-67	44	II, Kenya		Teacher	

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of		Age at	Education:		Former	
	Succ'n.	Succ'n.		Highest Level Attained	Occupation	Notes	
<u>LESOTHO (10-4-66)</u>							
FF:							
<u>H.S. King Moshoeshoe II</u>	1960		21	III, Oxford	Traditional chief	Jan. 1967: P.M. Jonathan reduces Moshoeshoe to figurehead status	
<u>P.M. Leabua Jonathan</u>	10-66		52	I, Lesotho	Clerk, store-keeper, traditional chief		
<u>LIBERIA (1847)</u>							
FF:							
Pres. William V.S. Tubman	1-43		49	III, Cuttington Coll. (Lib.)	Lawyer, jurist	Died, July, 1971	
SS:							
V.P. William R. Tolbert	1-51		32	III, U. of Liberia	Ordained minister		
<u>Pres. W.R. Tolbert</u>	7-71		52	--	--		
<u>MALAGASY REP. (6-20-60)</u>							
FF:							
Pres. Philibert Tsiranana (PM, 1958)	6-60		42	II, France	Teacher	Forced to resign 10-8-72	
Deputy P.M., then 2nd V.P. Calvin Tsiebo (later VP)	6-60		63	II, Malagasy	Civil Servant		
SS:							
1st V.P. André Resampa	10-70		46	II, Malagasy	Civil Servant	Dismissed and tried, 6-1-71	
3rd, then 1st V.P. Jacques Rabemananjara	10-70		57	III, Paris	Novelist, poet, civil servant		
4th V.P., Victor Miadana	10-70		50	II, and tech., Malagasy	Politician		
5th V.P., Alfred Ramangasoavina	4-71		53	III, Paris	Lawyer, jurist		
V.P. Eugène B. Lechât	6-71		52	Tech.tg., France	Educator, politician		
P.M., then <u>Pres. Gabriel Ramanantsoa</u>	10-72		64	St. Cyr, Paris	Military (Gen.)	Takes power 10-11-72	

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of		Age at	Education:		Former Occupation	Notes
	Succ'n.	Succ'n.		Highest Level Attained			
<u>MALAWI (7-6-64)</u>							
FF: <u>Pres. Hastings K. Banda</u> (PM, 1963)	7-64	58		III, US and UK		Medical doctor	
<u>MALI (9-22-60)</u>							
FF: <u>Pres. Modibo Keita</u> (PM, 1957)	9-60	42		Wm. Ponty, Dakar		Teacher, civil servant	Removed by coup, 11-19-68
SS: <u>Pres. Moussa Traore</u>	11-68	32		II, mil.tg., France		Military (Lt.)	
<u>MAURITANIA (11-1-60)</u>							
FF: <u>Pres. Moktar Ould Daddah</u> (PM, 1959)	11-60	36		III, and post-grad., France		Lawyer	
<u>NIGER (8-30-60)</u>							
FF: <u>Pres. Hamani Diori</u>	8-60	44		II, Dahomey; Wm. Ponty, Dakar		Civil Servant and teacher	Removed by coup, 4-15-74
SS: <u>H.S., Pres. Seyni Kountche</u>	4-74	43		II, Mil.sch. in Mali, Senegal, France		Military (Lt. Col.)	
<u>NIGERIA (10-1-60)</u>							
FF: <u>Pres. Nnamdi Azikiwe</u>	10-60	56		III, SU		Teacher, journalist	Removed by coup, 1-15-66
<u>P.M. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa</u>	"	48		II, Nigeria; U., London		Teacher	Murdered, 1-15-66
SS: <u>H.S. J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi^d</u>	1-66	41		II, mil.tg., UK		Military (Maj. Gen.)	Murdered, 7-29-66, during coup led by Gowon

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of		Age at Succ'n.	Education: Highest Level Attained		Former Occupation	Notes
	Succ'n.						
<u>NIGERIA (10-1-60) (continued)</u>							
<u>H.S. Yakubu Gowon^d</u>	7-66		31	Sandhurst, UK		Military (Col.)	
<u>RWANDA (7-1-62)</u>							
FF: Pres. and P. M. Gregoire Kayibanda	7-62		38	II, (Cath. seminary) Rwanda		Teacher	Removed by coup, 7-5-73
SS: H.S., Pres. Juvénal Habyalimana	7-73		36	n. d.		Military (Gen.)	
<u>SENEGAL (8-29-60)</u>							
FF: Pres. Leopold S. Senghor (Pres. of Mali Federation, 1958-60)	8-60		54	III, Paris (Doctorate: agrégation)		Univ. prof., poet	
P.M. Mamadou Dia	8-60		51	III, Paris		Teacher	Dismissed, tried, 12-62; PMship eliminated, reinstated 2-1-70
SS: P.M. Abdou Diouf	2-70		35	III, Dakar and Paris		Civil Servant	
<u>SIERRA LEONE (4-27-61)</u>							
FF: P.M. Milton Margai	4-61		66	III, UK (Durham)		Medical doctor	Died 4-28-64
SS: P.M. Albert Margai	4-64		54	III, UK		Lawyer	Succeeds brother Milton
P.M. Siaka Stevens	3-67		62	II, UK		Policeman	In office 1 day (March 21)
H.S. David Lansana	3-67		45	II, Sierra Leone; H. Mil., UK		Military (Brig.)	2-day coup, March 21-23

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of Succ'n.	Age of Succ'n.	Education:		Former Occupation	Notes
			Highest Level Attained			
<u>SIERRA LEONE (4-27-61) (continued)</u>						
H.S. Andrew Juxon Smith	3-67	36	Sandhurst, UK		Military (Lt. Col.)	Coup removes Lansana
P.M., then Pres. (1971) S. Stevens	4-68	63	--		--	Restored by coup, 4-29-68
V.P. and P.M. S. Ibrahim Koroma	4-71	41	II, Sierra Leone		Businessman, politician	
<u>SOMALIA (7-1-60)</u>						
FF:						
Pres. Aden Abdulla Osman	7-60	52	No formal; limited		Administrator	
P.M. Abdirashid Ali Shirmarke	"	41	III, (Oxford, PhD)		Civil Servant	
SS:						
P.M. Abdirazak Hussein	6-64	51	III, Egypt (Cairo)		Civil Servant	Assassinated 10-15-69
Pres. A.A. Shirmarke	6-67	48	--		--	Removed by coup, 10-29-69
P.M. Ibrahim Egal	"	46	II, private, UK		Businessman	
Pres. Mohammed Siyad Barre	10-69	50	I, Self-taught, mil.tg.			
<u>SUDAN (1-1-56)</u>						
FF:						
P.M. Ismail al Azhari	1-56	41	III, Beirut (American U.)		Teacher	Died 1969
SS:						
P.M. Abdullah Khalil	7-56	68	II, Mil.coll., Khartoum		Military	Removed by coup, 11-3-58
Pres. and P.M. Ibrahim Abboud	11-58	58	II, Mil.coll., Khartoum		Military (Lt. Gen.)	Removed by revolt, 10-3-64
P.M. Serr Al Khatim al Khalifa	10-64	46	II, Sudan		Teacher	
P.M. Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub	6-65	57	III, Sudan		Lawyer	
P.M. Sadik el Mahdi	8-66	30	III, UK (Oxford)		Religious leader, politician	Died 1972, during att. revolt

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of Succ'n.	Age at Succ'n.	Education:		Former Occupation	Notes
			Highest Level Attained			
SUDAN (1-1-56) (continued)						
P.M. M.A. Mahgoub	5-67	59	--	--	--	Removed by Nimeri coup
P.M. Abu Bakr Awadullah	5-69	54	III, UK		Lawyer	Installed by Junta
Pres. Gaafar Nimeri	5-69	39	II, Mil.coll., Khartoum		Military (Maj. Gen.)	Gains power by coup, 5-25-69
SWAZILAND (9-6-68)						
FF:						
H.S. King Sobhuza II (Paramount Chief, 1921)	9-68	69	Private		Traditional chief	On 6-1-73 King Sobhuza suspended constitution, dismissed PM, dissolved parties
P.M. Prince Makhosini Dlamini	"	54	2dy, Swaziland		Teacher	
TANZANIA (12-9-61)						
FF:						
Pres. Julius K. Nyerere (Chief Minister, 1960)	12-61	43	III, Uganda (Makerere), UK (Edinburgh)		Civil Servant, teacher	
SS:						
1st V.P. Abeid Karume	5-64	59	I, (2d grade)		Seaman	Assassinated, 4-7-72
2nd V.P. Rashidi Kawawa	5-64	35	II, Tanzania		Civil Servant	
1st V.P. Aboud Jumbe	4-72	52	III, Uganda (Makerere)		Trade unionist, teacher	
TOGO (4-27-60)						
FF:						
Pres. Sylvanus Olympio	4-60	60	III, London		Businessman	Assassinated, 1-13-63, during coup

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of		Age at Succ'n.	Education: Highest Level Attained		Former Occupation	Notes
	Succ'n.						
<u>TOGO (4-27-60) (continued)</u>							
SS:							
Pres. Nicolas Grunitzky	5-63		50	III, France		Civil engineer	Installed by mil. junta
V. P. Antoine Méatchi	5-63		38	III, France		Civil Servant	Installed by mil. junta
H. S., Chmn. Kléber Dadjoe	1-67		53	II, Togo; mil. tg.		Military (Col.)	Mil. coup, 1-13-67
Pres. Etienne Eyadema	4-67		31	I, Togo; mil. tg.		Military (Lt. Col.)	
<u>UGANDA (10-9-62)</u>							
FF:							
Pres. Sir Edward Mutesa	10-62		36	III, UK (Cambridge)		Trad. ruler of Buganda	Deposed by Obote "putsch"; died in exile, Nov. 1969
P. M. Milton A. Obote	10-62		34	III, Uganda (Makerere)		Teacher	Removed by coup, 1-25-71
SS:							
(Exec.) Pres. M. A. Obote	4-66		40	--		--	
Pres. Idi Dada Amin	1-71		45	I, mil. tg.		Military (Maj. Gen.)	
<u>UPPER VOLTA (8-5-60)</u>							
FF:							
Pres. Maurice Yameogo (PM, 1958)	8-60		39	II, U. Volta		Civil Servant	Removed by coup, 1-3-66
SS:							
Pres. Sangoulé Lamizana	1-66		50	II, U. Volta; mil. tg.		Military (Gen.)	Partial restoration of civilian rule 1-71
P. M. Gérard Kango	1-71		46	II, U. Volta		Civil Servant	to 2-74, when Lamizana dismissed Ouedraogo, assumed sole power
Ouedraogo							

Title and Name	Mo., Yr. of		Age at	Education:		Former Occupation	Notes
	Succ'n.	Succ'n.		Highest Level	Attained		
<u>ZAMBIA (10-24-64)</u>							
FF:							
<u>Pres. Kenneth D. Kaunda</u>	10-64	40	II, Zambia		Farmer, teacher		
SS:							
V.P. Simon M. Kapwepwe	9-67	45	III, Bombay		Teacher		Resigned, Nov. 1970
V.P. Mathias Mainza Chona	11-70	40	III, London		Lawyer		
<u>ZAIRE (6-30-60)</u>							
FF:							
<u>Pres. Joseph Kasavubu</u>	6-60	50	II, Congo (seminary)		Teacher, Civil Servant		Removed by Mobutu, 9-15-60; died, 3-24-69
<u>P.M. Patrice Lumumba</u>	6-60	35	II, Congo		Civil Servant		Murdered, 2-13-61
SS:							
P.M. Joseph Ileo	9-60	40	II, Congo		Accountant		Replaces Lumumba
H.S. Joseph Mobutu	9-60	29	II, Congo (Mil. school)		Military (Col.)		
Pres. J. Kasavubu	2-61	51	--		--		Re-instated by Mobutu
P.M. Cyrille Adoula	8-61	40	II, Congo		Trade unionist		
P.M. Moise Tshombe	7-64	45	II, Congo		Businessman		Ex-PM of secessionist province Katanga; died 1969
P.M. Evariste Kimba	10-65	39	II, Congo		Journalist, railway foreman		Ex-Foreign Min. of Katanga; executed 6-3-66
FF:							
<u>H.S. J. Mobutu</u>	11-65	35	--		--		Dismissed 10-26-66
<u>P.M. Leonard Mulamba</u>	"	36	II, Congo; mil. tg.		Military (Col.)		
Pres. and P.M. J. Mobutu (now Sese Seko Mobutu)	10-66	--	--		--		

*Notes and Key to Symbols and Abbreviations in Annex A:

1. Leaders whose names are underlined were in office on December 31, 1974.
2. Footnotes are located on the last page of this Annex.
3. Sources: See Annex C.
4. Symbols and abbreviations:
 - a. Generational categories
 - FF: Founding Father(s)
 - SS: Successor(s)
 - b. Official titles and positions
 - H.S.: Head of State
 - H.G.: Head of Government
 - Pres.: President
 - V.P.: Vice-President
 - P.M.: Prime Minister or Premier
 - L.G.B.: Leader of Government Business
 - Chmn.: Chairman; usually of a military junta
 - Dep.: Deputy
 - c. Educational levels and terms
 - I: Primary grades; self-taught to Primary level
 - II: Secondary grades; high school, lycée, etc.
 - III: Post-secondary, including University, post-graduate study
 - mil.: military
 - tech.: technical
 - tg.: training
 - sch.: school(ing)
 - d. Other
 - n.d.: no data

Notes to Annex A:

a. Emperor Haile Selassie was formally deposed on September 12, 1974, by the Armed Forces Committee, and a Provisional Military Government was established. The latter soon became known as the Provisional Military Administrative Council, but its membership remained obscure until it announced that General Aman Andom had been named Chairman. The proclamation of deposition named Crown Prince Asfa-Wossen to succeed his father as King of Ethiopia, but Asfa-Wossen, in England during these events, refused to return to assume the throne. By November dissensions within the PMAC had become public, and on November 23, General Aman Andom apparently died in an attack on his house as he sought to avoid arrest by the PMAC. Also on November 23 some 59 other former officials and military officers and men were executed by the regime, among them two former Prime Ministers, the President of the Crown Council, 17 general officers of the Army, and one Rear Admiral. On November 18 it was revealed that Chairman of the "Coordinating Committee" (said to be the executive committee of the PMAC) was Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, while the PMACs overall--and allegedly figurehead--Chairman was Brigadier Teferi Benti. Both Benti and Mengistu Haile Mariam are listed as incumbents, the former because of his formal title, the latter because (by all reports) he appears to be the dominant figure in the PMAC.

b. General Ankrah was Chairman of Ghana's National Liberation Council; Colonel Acheampong is Chairman of the National Redemption Council.

c. On September 25, 1973, radio Conakry broadcast a proclamation of "an independent state of Guinea-Bissau" following a constituent assembly held in Guinea-Bissau September 23 and 24. At least a dozen countries recognized the new republic within hours of the proclamation and many more followed suit within a few days. It was not, however, until September 9, 1974, that Portugal recognized the new state as a sovereign entity, signing a document officially ending Guinea-Bissau's previous status as a Portuguese overseas territory.

d. General Aguiyi-Ironsi was "Head of the Federal Military Government," and his successor, Colonel (now Major General) Gowon, took the same title.

e. Colonel Kléber Dadjo was only briefly Chairman of the group of officers that overthrew the government of President Nicolas Grunitzky on January 12, 1967. The coup had in fact been led by Lt. Col. Eyadema, and he was the junta's spokesman from the start. He officially assumed the Presidency in April, 1967.

ANNEX B

Definitions of Types of Succession Events Enumerated in Table 1

I. Regular Executive Transfers:

Succession takes place according to established rules governing succession, usually embodied in constitutional or statutory documents. Included would also be succession according to unwritten "traditional" rules or customs. I have summarized examples of such rules in "Problems of Political Succession in Independent Africa," pp. 93-95, in Ali A. Mazrui and Hasu Patel (eds.), Africa in World Affairs (New York: The Third Press, 1973). Examples of the latter type would include succession to the Swazi, Watusi, Basotho paramount chieftaincies, all of which are regulated by custom and tradition.

- A. Elections. Usually, in Africa, a general election in which a new legislature is selected, which then endorses a head of government, or in which a head of state is elected. (Examples: Sierra Leone, Somalia, before their respective coups; the Ghana elections of 1969, which swept the party of Dr. Kofi A. Busia to power.)
- B. Cabinet shakeup, crisis, or revision. Most of the several Burundi Prime Ministers in office between 1963 and 1966 succeeded one another at the instance of the Mwami when he "shook up" his cabinets or strove to settle a "cabinet crisis." The critical definitional point is that the succession is accomplished in accord with the law, whatever the circumstances leading to it. If violence or the threat of violence accompanies the event, it falls under II, below.
- C. Amalgamation or constitutional revision. Succession that takes place as a result of some sort of major constitutional change in which positions are created or abolished. In Cameroon, the office of Federal Vice-President was created as a result of the merger of the British and former French Cameroons, which united to form a Federal Republic. Similarly, the merger of Zanzibar and Tanzania in 1964 resulted in the succession of Abeid Karume to the First Vice-Presidency of the new United Republic. A third instance is the Prime Ministry of G. K. Ouedraogo (Upper Volta), a direct result of a constitutional revision sponsored by the military regime of President Sangoulé Lamizana in 1971.

- D. Natural or accidental death of a head of state or government. Again, the succession is in accordance with the rules governing such events. Examples: Liberia (1971); Gabon (1967); CAR (1959, Dacko for Boganda, when the latter was killed in an airplane crash).

On occasion irregular power changes (defined below) follow hard upon regular executive transfers, so that the former seem almost as preludes to the latter. For example, the Sierra Leone elections of March 17, 1967, were followed by the appointment of Mr. Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister on March 21, and on the next day, by the coup d'etat staged by Brigadier David Lansana. In such a circumstance a succession event is counted as "regular" when it is in fact consummated, regardless of its immediate or near consequences. In the Sierra Leone case, the fact that Mr. Stevens was in fact appointed Prime Minister by the Governor-General, Sir Henry Lightfoot Boston, is sufficient to place his succession in the "regular" category, despite the fact that he served only one day. The Lansana coup, though it also lasted a single day, nonetheless qualifies as an "irregular" succession by the same criterion. Had Lansana "consummated" his seizure of power? All the evidence indicates that he had, despite the fact that he was displaced the next day by Brigadier Andrew Juxon Smith.

II. Irregular Power Transfers:

"An irregular power transfer is a change in the office of national executive from one leader or ruling group to another that is accomplished outside the conventional legal or customary procedures for transferring power in effect at the time of the event. Such events are accompanied either by actual physical violence or by the clear threat of violence. These events thus encompass the bloodless deposition of rulers as well as the more spectacular sanguinary variety." Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2nd. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 86.

- A. Assassinations, political murders. See "Note b" to Table 1.
- B. Depositions. See "Note c" to Table 1.
- C. Elimination contests; resignations. The term is, admittedly, somewhat ambiguous. What is intended is reference to those situations often termed "palace power struggles" in which leaders are forced out as a result of confrontations within the ruling

group. Succession to the top positions in the USSR seems almost exclusively to fall within these terms. Two African examples are the ouster of P. M. Mamadou Dia (Senegal) in 1962, and the game of political musical chairs in Dahomey in 1965 that eventually resulted in the second Soglo coup.

- D. Coups d'etat. "This category refers to cases of successful takeovers either by Security Forces (the Army, the Police, the Navy, the Air Force) or by civilians (e. g., Sudan, 1964, Lesotho, 1970, etc.)." Ladun Anise, "Trends in Leadership Succession and Regime Change in African Politics Since Independence," unpublished paper presented at 15th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Philadelphia, 1972, p. 10. I have categorized coups according to the principal groups involved, including police, navy, air force, in the term "military," since there are no instances of coups led by police, naval, or air forces, or in which they were the primary movers. The Sudan coup of 1964, incidentally, involved both civilian and military components, though the latter played a minor role in the events that resulted in the ouster of President Abboud. See also "Note d" to Table 1.
- E. Designation/appointment. See "Note e" to Table 1.

ANNEX C

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